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'Constrained Discretion' in UK Monetary and Regional Policy

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  • Eric Mcvittie
  • J. Kim Swales

Abstract

McVittie E. and Swales J. K. (2007) 'Constrained discretion' in UK monetary and regional policy, Regional Studies 41, -. H. M. Treasury claims that the notion of 'constrained discretion', which directs the effective operation of UK monetary policy, applies equally to other delegated and devolved policies, such as the use of Regional Development Agencies in the delivery of English regional policy. A 'transaction cost politics' perspective is used to argue that the delegation of responsibility for monetary stabilization raises principal agent issues quite different to those encountered in the delegation of the responsibility for regional regeneration. In particular, the effectiveness and transparency that characterize present-day monetary policy cannot be expected in regional policy. Further, the institutional arrangements that accompany the operation of Regional Development Agencies in England should be critically reviewed. McVittie E. et Swales J. K. (2007) La notion de 'discretion entravee' dans les politiques monetaire et regionale au R-U, Regional Studies 41, -. H. M. Treasury (le ministere des Finances au Royaume-Uni) pretend que la notion de 'discretion entravee' qui pilote efficacement la politique monetaire au R-U, s'applique aussi a d'autres politiques deconcentrees et decentralisees, tel l'emploi des Regional Development Agencies (des agences publiques chargees du developpement economique regional) dans la mise en oeuvre de la politique regionale en Angleterre. On se sert d' une 'politique axee sur les couts d'operation' afin d'affirmer que la delegation des competences quant a la stabilisation monetaire pose des questions concernant l'agent principal qui se distinguent de celles posees pour ce qui est de la delegation des competences quant a la reconstruction regionale. En particulier, on ne peut pas s'attendre a ce que l'efficacite et la transparence, qui caracterisent la politique monetaire d'aujourd'hui, soient presentes dans la politique regionale. En outre, on devrait faire la critique des dispositions institutionnelles qui vont de pair avec le fonctionnement des agences en Angleterre. Agences publiques chargees du developpement economique regional Politique axee sur les couts d'operation Politique regionale Delegation McVittie E. und Swales J. K. (2007) 'Erzwungene Vorsicht' bei der Finanz- und Regionalpolitik des Vereinigten Konigreichs, Regional Studies 41, -. Das Finanzministerium von Grossbritannien behauptet, dass der Begriff einer 'erzwungenen Vorsicht', der die effektive Handhabung der Finanzpolitik des UK bestimmt, gleichermassen auf andere ubertragene und in Auftrag gegebene Politiken zutrifft, wie etwa auf den Einsatz der regionalen Entwicklungsagenturen (Regional Development Agencies = RDAs) zur Ausfuhrung der englischen Regionalpolitik. Die Autoren bedienen sich einer Perspektive der 'Transaktionskostenpolitik' (transaction cost politics), um den Standpunkt zu vertreten, dass die Ubertragung der Verantwortung fur finanzielle Stabilisierung Fragen der Hauptvertretung aufwirft, die stark von denjenigen abweichen, auf die man bei der Delegation der Verantwortung fur regionale Regenerierung stosst. Vor allem konnen die Effektivitat und Transparenz, welche die heutige Finanzpolitik kennzeichnen, nicht von der Regionalpolitik erwartet werden. Ausserdem sollten die institutionellen Einrichtungen kritisch besprochen werden, die den Einsatz der RDAs in England begleiten. Regionale Entwicklungsagenturen Transaktionskostenpolitiken Regionalpolitik Delegation McVittie E. y Swales J. K. (2007) 'Discrecion limitada' en las politicas monetaria y regional del Reino Unido, Regional Studies 41, -. El Tesoro britanico reclama que la nocion de 'discrecion limitada' que dirige la operacion eficaz de la politica monetaria del Reino Unido se aplique equitativamente a otros politicas delegadas y descentralizadas, tales como el uso de las Agencias de Desarrollo Regional (ADR) en la entrega de la politica regional inglesa. Usamos una perspectiva de 'politicas de costes de transaccion' para argumentar que delegar responsabilidades con respecto a la estabilizacion monetaria plantea problemas con los agentes principales bastante diferentes a los que ocurren al delegar la responsabilidad de regeneracion regional. Especialmente, la eficacia y transparencia que caracteriza la politica monetaria actual no puede esperarse en la politica regional. Asimismo deberian revisarse concienzudamente los acuerdos institucionales que acompanan la operacion de las ADR en Inglaterra. Agencias de desarrollo regional Politicas para costes de transaccion Politica regional Delegar

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Mcvittie & J. Kim Swales, 2007. "'Constrained Discretion' in UK Monetary and Regional Policy," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(2), pages 267-280.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:regstd:v:41:y:2007:i:2:p:267-280
    DOI: 10.1080/00343400601056961
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    1. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A., 2005. "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 385-472, Elsevier.
    2. Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, 2002. "Does it pay to be transparent? international evidence form central bank forecasts," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 84(Jul), pages 99-118.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kim Swales, 2008. "The Relative Efficiency of Automatic and Discretionary Industrial Aid," Working Papers 0812, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
    2. Graham Pearce & Sarah Ayres, 2009. "Governance in the English Regions: The Role of the Regional Development Agencies," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 46(3), pages 537-557, March.
    3. J. Kim Swales & David Learmonth, 2005. "Policy Spillovers in a Regional Target-Setting Regime," ERSA conference papers ersa05p341, European Regional Science Association.

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