IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/regstd/v41y2007i2p267-280.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

'Constrained Discretion' in UK Monetary and Regional Policy

Author

Listed:
  • Eric Mcvittie
  • J. Kim Swales

Abstract

McVittie E. and Swales J. K. (2007) 'Constrained discretion' in UK monetary and regional policy, Regional Studies 41, -. H. M. Treasury claims that the notion of 'constrained discretion', which directs the effective operation of UK monetary policy, applies equally to other delegated and devolved policies, such as the use of Regional Development Agencies in the delivery of English regional policy. A 'transaction cost politics' perspective is used to argue that the delegation of responsibility for monetary stabilization raises principal agent issues quite different to those encountered in the delegation of the responsibility for regional regeneration. In particular, the effectiveness and transparency that characterize present-day monetary policy cannot be expected in regional policy. Further, the institutional arrangements that accompany the operation of Regional Development Agencies in England should be critically reviewed. McVittie E. et Swales J. K. (2007) La notion de 'discretion entravee' dans les politiques monetaire et regionale au R-U, Regional Studies 41, -. H. M. Treasury (le ministere des Finances au Royaume-Uni) pretend que la notion de 'discretion entravee' qui pilote efficacement la politique monetaire au R-U, s'applique aussi a d'autres politiques deconcentrees et decentralisees, tel l'emploi des Regional Development Agencies (des agences publiques chargees du developpement economique regional) dans la mise en oeuvre de la politique regionale en Angleterre. On se sert d' une 'politique axee sur les couts d'operation' afin d'affirmer que la delegation des competences quant a la stabilisation monetaire pose des questions concernant l'agent principal qui se distinguent de celles posees pour ce qui est de la delegation des competences quant a la reconstruction regionale. En particulier, on ne peut pas s'attendre a ce que l'efficacite et la transparence, qui caracterisent la politique monetaire d'aujourd'hui, soient presentes dans la politique regionale. En outre, on devrait faire la critique des dispositions institutionnelles qui vont de pair avec le fonctionnement des agences en Angleterre. Agences publiques chargees du developpement economique regional Politique axee sur les couts d'operation Politique regionale Delegation McVittie E. und Swales J. K. (2007) 'Erzwungene Vorsicht' bei der Finanz- und Regionalpolitik des Vereinigten Konigreichs, Regional Studies 41, -. Das Finanzministerium von Grossbritannien behauptet, dass der Begriff einer 'erzwungenen Vorsicht', der die effektive Handhabung der Finanzpolitik des UK bestimmt, gleichermassen auf andere ubertragene und in Auftrag gegebene Politiken zutrifft, wie etwa auf den Einsatz der regionalen Entwicklungsagenturen (Regional Development Agencies = RDAs) zur Ausfuhrung der englischen Regionalpolitik. Die Autoren bedienen sich einer Perspektive der 'Transaktionskostenpolitik' (transaction cost politics), um den Standpunkt zu vertreten, dass die Ubertragung der Verantwortung fur finanzielle Stabilisierung Fragen der Hauptvertretung aufwirft, die stark von denjenigen abweichen, auf die man bei der Delegation der Verantwortung fur regionale Regenerierung stosst. Vor allem konnen die Effektivitat und Transparenz, welche die heutige Finanzpolitik kennzeichnen, nicht von der Regionalpolitik erwartet werden. Ausserdem sollten die institutionellen Einrichtungen kritisch besprochen werden, die den Einsatz der RDAs in England begleiten. Regionale Entwicklungsagenturen Transaktionskostenpolitiken Regionalpolitik Delegation McVittie E. y Swales J. K. (2007) 'Discrecion limitada' en las politicas monetaria y regional del Reino Unido, Regional Studies 41, -. El Tesoro britanico reclama que la nocion de 'discrecion limitada' que dirige la operacion eficaz de la politica monetaria del Reino Unido se aplique equitativamente a otros politicas delegadas y descentralizadas, tales como el uso de las Agencias de Desarrollo Regional (ADR) en la entrega de la politica regional inglesa. Usamos una perspectiva de 'politicas de costes de transaccion' para argumentar que delegar responsabilidades con respecto a la estabilizacion monetaria plantea problemas con los agentes principales bastante diferentes a los que ocurren al delegar la responsabilidad de regeneracion regional. Especialmente, la eficacia y transparencia que caracteriza la politica monetaria actual no puede esperarse en la politica regional. Asimismo deberian revisarse concienzudamente los acuerdos institucionales que acompanan la operacion de las ADR en Inglaterra. Agencias de desarrollo regional Politicas para costes de transaccion Politica regional Delegar

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Mcvittie & J. Kim Swales, 2007. "'Constrained Discretion' in UK Monetary and Regional Policy," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(2), pages 267-280.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:regstd:v:41:y:2007:i:2:p:267-280
    DOI: 10.1080/00343400601056961
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00343400601056961
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/00343400601056961?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, 2002. "Does it pay to be transparent? international evidence form central bank forecasts," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 84(Jul), pages 99-118.
    2. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A., 2005. "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 385-472, Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Graham Pearce & Sarah Ayres, 2009. "Governance in the English Regions: The Role of the Regional Development Agencies," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 46(3), pages 537-557, March.
    2. Swales, J. Kim, 2008. "The Relative Efficiency of Automatic and Discretionary Industrial Aid," SIRE Discussion Papers 2008-50, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    3. J. Kim Swales & David Learmonth, 2005. "Policy Spillovers in a Regional Target-Setting Regime," ERSA conference papers ersa05p341, European Regional Science Association.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Vieira, Flávio & MacDonald, Ronald & Damasceno, Aderbal, 2012. "The role of institutions in cross-section income and panel data growth models: A deeper investigation on the weakness and proliferation of instruments," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 127-140.
    2. Kumari, Khushboo & Ramachandran, Renjith, 2024. "The never-ending debate: Do FDI promote institutional change? Evidence from India and partner countries," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 432-447.
    3. Cruzatti C., John & Bjørnskov, Christian & Sáenz de Viteri, Andrea & Cruzatti, Christian, 2024. "Geography, development, and power: Parliament leaders and local clientelism," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 182(C).
    4. Eicher, Theo S. & Schreiber, Till, 2010. "Structural policies and growth: Time series evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 169-179, January.
    5. Szörfi, Béla & Augusztin, Anna & Iker, Áron & Monisso, Anna, 2025. "The growth effect of EU funds – the role of institutional quality," Working Paper Series 3014, European Central Bank.
    6. Kholeka Mdingi & Sin-Yu Ho, 2023. "Income inequality and economic growth: An empirical investigation in South Africa," Cogent Economics & Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 2230027-223, June.
    7. Czeglédi, Pál, 2009. "A tulajdonjogi biztonság szerepe a technológia elterjedésében [The role of property-law security in the spread of technology]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 790-813.
    8. Henrekson, Magnus & Johansson, Dan, 2010. "Firm Growth, Institutions and Structural Transformation," Ratio Working Papers 150, The Ratio Institute.
    9. Domenico Giannone & Michele Lenza & Lucrezia Reichlin, 2011. "Market Freedom and the Global Recession," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 59(1), pages 111-135, April.
    10. Andrea Ascani & Riccardo Crescenzi & Simona Iammarino, 2015. "Economic Institutions and the Location Strategies of European Multinationals in their Geographical Neighbourhood," LEQS – LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series 97, European Institute, LSE.
    11. Dong, Zhiqiang & Zhang, Yongjing, 2016. "Accumulated social capital, institutional quality, and economic performance: Evidence from China," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 206-219.
    12. Azariadis, Costas & Stachurski, John, 2005. "Poverty Traps," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, Elsevier.
    13. Gruener Hans Peter & Hayo Bernd & Hefeker Carsten, 2009. "Unions, Wage Setting and Monetary Policy Uncertainty," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-25, October.
    14. Canavire-Bacarreza, Gustavo & Martínez-Vázquez, Jorge & Vulovic, Violeta, 2013. "Taxation and Economic Growth in Latin America," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 4583, Inter-American Development Bank.
    15. Alexandre De Podestá Gomes, 2018. "The mainstream economics interpretation of the local state and central-local relations in Post-Mao China: a critical review," Working Papers 214, Department of Economics, SOAS University of London, UK.
    16. Axel Dreher & Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Friedrich Schneider, 2014. "The devil is in the shadow: Do institutions affect income and productivity or only official income and official productivity?," Post-Print CEB, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 158(1-2), pages 121-141, January.
    17. Chikán, Attila & Molnár, Boglárka & Szabó, Erika, 2018. "A nemzeti versenyképesség fogalma és támogató intézményi rendszere [The concept of national competitiveness and the institutional system to support it]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1205-1224.
    18. Ott, Ingrid & Soretz, Susanne, 2008. "Growth strategies: Fiscal versus institutional policies," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 605-622, July.
    19. Alogoskoufis, George, 2021. "Historical cycles of the economy of modern Greece from 1821 to the present," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 109848, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    20. Tiago Neves Sequeira & Marcelo Santos, 2019. "Technology in 1500 and genetic diversity," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1145-1165, April.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:regstd:v:41:y:2007:i:2:p:267-280. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/CRES20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.