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Determinants of demand for technology in relationships with complementary assets among Japanese firms

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  • Masayo Kani
  • Kazuyuki Motohashi

Abstract

There has been growing interest in open innovation by firms creating new value by combining internal and external ideas. Technology insourcing, however, has not been satisfactorily investigated compared to technology outsourcing in empirical literature. In this paper, we examine the determinants of external technology sourcing by types of the counterpart in new product development (NPD). We use a novel dataset at the product level, conducted by RIETI in 2011. We highlight cases in which a technology partner is also a business partner, such as a supplier or customer, from those where this is not the case. In contrast, in cases when a technology partner is not a business partner, patents play an important role in moderating transaction costs in partnerships. In contrast, in cases when a technology partner is also a business partner, we found a pattern of co-specialization of managerial resources with the partner firm.Abbreviations: B2B: Business to business; NPD: New product development; RBV: Resource-based view

Suggested Citation

  • Masayo Kani & Kazuyuki Motohashi, 2017. "Determinants of demand for technology in relationships with complementary assets among Japanese firms," China Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(2), pages 244-262, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:rcejxx:v:10:y:2017:i:2:p:244-262
    DOI: 10.1080/17538963.2017.1320048
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    Cited by:

    1. KANI Masayo & MOTOHASHI Kazuyuki, 2018. "Technology Sourcing in New Product Development Projects: When and how to use external resources?," Discussion papers 18042, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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