IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/raaexx/v24y2017i1-2p1-22.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Who benefits from political connections? Minority investors or controlling shareholders

Author

Listed:
  • Lihong Wang
  • Philip T. Lin

Abstract

Using a sample of Chinese privately controlled firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange during 2003–2012, this paper empirically examines the relation between politically connected independent directors and firm value creation and value expropriation. Our empirical results show that having politicians as independent directors helps listed privately controlled firms to increase subsidies received from the government as well as obtain an ease of access to long-term bank financing. In contrast, we discern that a large fraction of politically connected independent directors increases the magnitude of related-party transactions between the listed firms and their controlling parties, suggesting wealth expropriating from minority shareholders. Finally, when exploring the net effects of political connections, the presence of politically connected independent directors promotes firm profitability and adds residual value to Chinese listed privately controlled firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Lihong Wang & Philip T. Lin, 2017. "Who benefits from political connections? Minority investors or controlling shareholders," Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(1-2), pages 1-22, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:raaexx:v:24:y:2017:i:1-2:p:1-22
    DOI: 10.1080/16081625.2016.1151364
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/16081625.2016.1151364
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/16081625.2016.1151364?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fan, Joseph P.H. & Wong, T.J. & Zhang, Tianyu, 2007. "Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 330-357, May.
    2. Wang, Lihong, 2015. "Protection or expropriation: Politically connected independent directors in China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 92-106.
    3. Berkman, Henk & Cole, Rebel A. & Fu, Lawrence J., 2010. "Political Connections and Minority-Shareholder Protection: Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(6), pages 1391-1417, December.
    4. Cameron, A. Colin & Gelbach, Jonah B. & Miller, Douglas L., 2011. "Robust Inference With Multiway Clustering," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 29(2), pages 238-249.
    5. Li, Kai & Yue, Heng & Zhao, Longkai, 2009. "Ownership, institutions, and capital structure: Evidence from China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 471-490, September.
    6. Cheung, Yan-Leung & Rau, P. Raghavendra & Stouraitis, Aris, 2006. "Tunneling, propping, and expropriation: evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 343-386, November.
    7. Liu, Qiao & Lu, Zhou (Joe), 2007. "Corporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed companies: A tunneling perspective," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(5), pages 881-906, December.
    8. Li, Hongbin & Meng, Lingsheng & Wang, Qian & Zhou, Li-An, 2008. "Political connections, financing and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 283-299, October.
    9. Jiang, Guohua & Lee, Charles M.C. & Yue, Heng, 2010. "Tunneling through intercorporate loans: The China experience," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 1-20, October.
    10. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
    11. Yeh, Yin-Hua & Woidtke, Tracie, 2005. "Commitment or entrenchment?: Controlling shareholders and board composition," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(7), pages 1857-1885, July.
    12. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2009_007 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Zhang, Huiming & Li, Lianshui & Zhou, Dequn & Zhou, Peng, 2014. "Political connections, government subsidies and firm financial performance: Evidence from renewable energy manufacturing in China," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 330-336.
    14. Firth, Michael & Lin, Chen & Liu, Ping & Wong, Sonia M.L., 2009. "Inside the black box: Bank credit allocation in China's private sector," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1144-1155, June.
    15. Liu, Jianlei & Uchida, Konari & Gao, Ruidong, 2012. "Political connections and the long-term stock performance of Chinese IPOs," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 814-833.
    16. Yeh, Yin-Hua & Shu, Pei-Gi & Chiu, Shean-Bii, 2013. "Political connections, corporate governance and preferential bank loans," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1079-1101.
    17. Lin Cui & Fuming Jiang, 2012. "State ownership effect on firms' FDI ownership decisions under institutional pressure: a study of Chinese outward-investing firms," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 43(3), pages 264-284, April.
    18. Chen, Charles J.P. & Li, Zengquan & Su, Xijia & Sun, Zheng, 2011. "Rent-seeking incentives, corporate political connections, and the control structure of private firms: Chinese evidence," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 229-243, April.
    19. Francis, Bill B. & Hasan, Iftekhar & Sun, Xian, 2009. "Political connections and the process of going public: Evidence from China," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 696-719, June.
    20. Lu, Zhengfei & Zhu, Jigao & Zhang, Weining, 2012. "Bank discrimination, holding bank ownership, and economic consequences: Evidence from China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 341-354.
    21. Zhou, Wubiao, 2009. "Bank Financing in China's Private Sector: The Payoffs of Political Capital," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 787-799, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lien‐Wen Liang & Tsui‐Jung Lin & Hui‐Fun Yu & Ya‐Wen Li, 2022. "The impact of political connection and board diversity on company performance: Evidence from China," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(6), pages 2347-2357, September.
    2. Ting Ren & Youzhi Xiao & Xinguo Yu & Hongyan Yang & Jianmei Ge, 2020. "Resignation of officials as independent directors and firm performance," Frontiers of Business Research in China, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 1-21, December.
    3. Budi Wahyono, 2022. "The value of political connections and Sharia compliance during the COVID-19 pandemic," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 12(1), pages 1-28, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Liu, Qigui & Luo, Tianpei & Tian, Gary Gang, 2015. "Family control and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 220-245.
    2. Liu, Qigui & Tang, Jinghua & Tian, Gary Gang, 2013. "Does political capital create value in the IPO market? Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 395-413.
    3. Su, Zhong-qin & Fung, Hung-Gay & Huang, Deng-shi & Shen, Chung-Hua, 2014. "Cash dividends, expropriation, and political connections: Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 260-272.
    4. He, Lerong & Wan, Hong & Zhou, Xin, 2014. "How are political connections valued in China? Evidence from market reaction to CEO succession," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 141-152.
    5. Can An & Xiaofei Pan & Gary Tian, 2016. "How Does Corporate Governance Affect Loan Collateral? Evidence from Chinese SOEs and Non-SOEs," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 16(3), pages 325-356, September.
    6. Wang, Lihong, 2015. "Protection or expropriation: Politically connected independent directors in China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 92-106.
    7. Li, Qing & Liu, Qigui & Ma, Shiguang & Tian, Gary Gang, 2019. "Loan financing and investment in princeling-backed firms," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 71-92.
    8. Song, Siwen & Jun, Aelee & Ma, Shiguang, 2021. "Corruption exposure, political disconnection, and their impact on Chinese family firms," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3).
    9. Ding, Mingfa, 2014. "Political Connections and Stock Liquidity: Political Network, Hierarchy and Intervention," Knut Wicksell Working Paper Series 2014/7, Lund University, Knut Wicksell Centre for Financial Studies.
    10. Guo, Kai & Ke, Bin & Tang, Song, 2023. "Private firms' financial constraints and share pledging by controlling shareholders of publicly listed firms: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    11. Shailer, Greg & Wang, Kun, 2015. "Government ownership and the cost of debt for Chinese listed corporations," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(C), pages 1-17.
    12. Li, Guoping & Zhou, Hong, 2015. "Political connections and access to IPO markets in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 76-93.
    13. Liu, Qigui & Luo, Tianpei & Tian, Gary, 2016. "Political connections with corrupt government bureaucrats and corporate M&A decisions: A natural experiment from the anti-corruption cases in China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 52-80.
    14. Paul B. McGuinness, 2016. "Post-IPO performance and its association with subscription cascades and issuers’ strategic-political importance," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 291-333, February.
    15. Dang, Vinh Q.T. & So, Erin P.K. & Yan, Isabel K.M., 2018. "The value of political connection: Evidence from the 2011 Egyptian revolution," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 238-257.
    16. Cull, Robert & Li, Wei & Sun, Bo & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2015. "Government connections and financial constraints: Evidence from a large representative sample of Chinese firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 271-294.
    17. Wenxuan Hou & Geoff Moore, 2010. "Player and Referee Roles Held Jointly: The Effect of State Ownership on China’s Regulatory Enforcement Against Fraud," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 95(2), pages 317-335, September.
    18. Jiang, Guohua & Rao, Pingui & Yue, Heng, 2015. "Tunneling through Non-Operational Fund Occupancy: An investigation based on officially identified activities," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 295-311.
    19. Hu, Yi & Wang, Changyun & Xiao, Gang & Zeng, Jianyu, 2020. "The agency cost of political connections: Evidence from China's File 18," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    20. Wenli Cheng & Yongzheng Wu, 2019. "Bank finance for private firms in China: Does political capital still pay off?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(1), pages 242-267, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:raaexx:v:24:y:2017:i:1-2:p:1-22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/raae20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.