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Statistical mechanics of asset markets with private information

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Listed:
  • J. Berg
  • M. Marsili
  • A. Rustichini
  • R. Zecchina

Abstract

Traders in a market typically have widely different, private information on the return of an asset. The equilibrium price of the asset may reflect this information more accurately if the number of traders is large enough compared to the number of the states of the world that determine the return of the asset. We study the transition from markets where prices do not reflect the information accurately into markets where it does. In competitive markets, this transition takes place suddenly, at a critical value of the ratio between number of states and number of traders. The Nash equilibrium market behaves quite differently from a competitive market even in the limit of large economies.

Suggested Citation

  • J. Berg & M. Marsili & A. Rustichini & R. Zecchina, 2001. "Statistical mechanics of asset markets with private information," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 203-211.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:quantf:v:1:y:2001:i:2:p:203-211
    DOI: 10.1080/713665667
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    1. Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1977. "Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(5), pages 937-968, October.
    2. Gul, Faruk & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1992. "Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1273-1292, November.
    3. Fama, Eugene F, 1970. "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 25(2), pages 383-417, May.
    4. Rustichini, Aldo & Satterthwaite, Mark A & Williams, Steven R, 1994. "Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 1041-1063, September.
    5. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marsili, Matteo, 2001. "Market mechanism and expectations in minority and majority games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 299(1), pages 93-103.
    2. L'eo Touzo & Matteo Marsili & Don Zagier, 2020. "Information thermodynamics of financial markets: the Glosten-Milgrom model," Papers 2010.01905, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2021.
    3. Goldbaum, David, 2006. "Self-organization and the persistence of noise in financial markets," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(9-10), pages 1837-1855.
    4. Jean Philippe Bouchaud & Matteo Marsili & Jean-Pierre Nadal, 2023. "Application of spin glass ideas in social sciences, economics and finance," Post-Print hal-04145594, HAL.
    5. Caccioli, Fabio & Marsili, Matteo, 2010. "Information efficiency and financial stability," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 4, pages 1-20.
    6. Ferreira, Fernando F. & Marsili, Matteo, 2005. "Real payoffs and virtual trading in agent based market models," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 345(3), pages 657-675.
    7. Jean-Philippe Bouchaud & Matteo Marsili & Jean-Pierre Nadal, 2023. "Application of spin glass ideas in social sciences, economics and finance," Papers 2306.16165, arXiv.org.

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