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Analysis of loan guarantees among the Korean Chaebol affiliates

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  • Taeyoung Doh
  • Keunkwan Ryu

Abstract

This paper analyses corporate loan guarantees among the Korean chaebol affiliates. Loan guarantees are found to be efficiency-neutral under a set of ideal conditions characterized by perfect and symmetric information, no agency problem, and no governmental interference in private financial contracts. In reality though, corporate loan guarantees have negative as well as positive effects. The negative effects of loan guarantees arise from the agency problem between the controlling minority shareholders and outside investors. Government's implicit support to financial institutions worsens the problem. Without such distortions, a loan guarantee by the guarantor firm may signal the quality of the investment project of the borrowing firm, if the guarantor firm has more information than the lending bank with regards to the type of the borrowing firm's investment project.

Suggested Citation

  • Taeyoung Doh & Keunkwan Ryu, 2004. "Analysis of loan guarantees among the Korean Chaebol affiliates," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(2), pages 161-178.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:intecj:v:18:y:2004:i:2:p:161-178
    DOI: 10.1080/1016873042000228312
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(3), pages 663-691.
    2. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    3. Kim, Se-Jik, 2004. "Bailout and conglomeration," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 315-347, February.
    4. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Microeconomics of Banking," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061937, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Song, Zhuo-lin & Zhang, Xiao-mei, 2018. "Lending technology and credit risk under different types of loans to SMEs: Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 43-69.
    2. Sooil Kim & Jeffrey J. Reimer & Munisamy Gopinath, 2011. "The Impact Of Trade Costs On Firm Entry, Exporting, And Survival In Korea," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(2), pages 434-446, April.
    3. Dawei Cheng & Zhibin Niu & Yi Tu & Liqing Zhang, 2017. "Prediction defaults for networked-guarantee loans," Papers 1702.04642, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2020.
    4. Yingli Wang & Qingpeng Zhang & Xiaoguang Yang, 2018. "Evolution of the Chinese Guarantee Network under Financial Crisis and Stimulus Program," Papers 1804.05667, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2020.
    5. Raymond Posey & Alan K. Reichert, 2011. "Terms Of Lending For Small Business Lines Of Credit: The Role Of Loan Guarantees," The International Journal of Business and Finance Research, The Institute for Business and Finance Research, vol. 5(1), pages 91-102.

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