IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/intecj/v14y2000i4p103-123.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Role of Gatt in Trade Negotiations: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Kim Gi-Hong

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to explain theoretically the role of GATT in tariff negotiations, without narrowly interpreting GATT as an agreement. This paper, which establishes a game model where two nations are involved in tariff negotiations, shows the following points. First, free trade is difficult to realize even in a world with complete information. Second, GATT can serve as a mechanism for nations to find a particular cooperative tariff under incomplete information. Third, gradual tariff reduction can be explained as the interaction between the gradual decline of domestic political pressure and multilateral tariff negotiations under GATT. [F13]

Suggested Citation

  • Kim Gi-Hong, 2000. "The Role of Gatt in Trade Negotiations: A Game-Theoretic Perspective," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(4), pages 103-123.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:intecj:v:14:y:2000:i:4:p:103-123
    DOI: 10.1080/10168730000000038
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10168730000000038
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/10168730000000038?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hungerford, T.L., 1990. "Gatt: A Cooperative Equilibrium In A Noncooperative Trading Regime?," Working Papers 262, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
    2. Ludema, Rodney D., 2001. "Optimal international trade agreements and dispute settlement procedures," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 355-376, June.
    3. repec:fth:michin:262 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Staiger, Robert W., 1995. "International rules and institutions for trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 29, pages 1495-1551, Elsevier.
    2. Dan Kovenock & Marie Thursby, 1992. "Gatt, Dispute Settlement And Cooperation," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 151-170, July.
    3. Kevin x.d. Huang & Engin Volkan & M. ege Yazgan, 2013. "Nonhomothetic Preferences with Habit Formation in Nondurable and Durable Consumption: Implications for Sectoral Comovement," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 13-00002, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    4. Vincent Anesi & Giovanni Facchini, 2019. "Coercive Trade Policy," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 225-256, August.
    5. Nuno Limão & Kamal Saggi, 2018. "Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Policy Externalities and International Trade Agreements, chapter 12, pages 337-349, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Nuno Limão & Kamal Saggi, 2018. "Size inequality, coordination externalities and international trade agreements," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Policy Externalities and International Trade Agreements, chapter 11, pages 319-336, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Kuenzel, David J., 2017. "WTO dispute determinants," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 157-179.
    8. Hillman, Arye L., 2003. "Trade Liberalization and Globalization: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 3845, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Chad P. Bown & Kara M. Reynolds, 2017. "Trade Agreements and Enforcement: Evidence from WTO Dispute Settlement," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 64-100, November.
    10. Frischmann Brett M. & Hartigan James C., 2011. "Compliance Institutions in Treaties," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 86-117, May.
    11. Racem Mehdi, 2008. "The sustainable cooperative tariffs : a political economy perspective," Post-Print halshs-00261577, HAL.
    12. Mostafa Beshkar, 2016. "Arbitration and Renegotiation in Trade Agreements," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(3), pages 586-619.
    13. Keck, Alexander & Schropp, Simon, 2007. "Indisputably essential: The economics of dispute settlement institutions in trade agreements," WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2007-02, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
    14. Wilfred J. Ethier, "undated". "Punishment and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements," EPRU Working Paper Series 01-14, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    15. Pao-Li Chang, 2004. "The Politics of WTO Enforcement Mechanisms," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 117, Econometric Society.
    16. Klimenko, Mikhail & Ramey, Garey & Watson, Joel, 2008. "Recurrent trade agreements and the value of external enforcement," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 475-499, March.
    17. Jun Oshiro, 2011. "Tariff Policy and Transport Costs under Reciprocal Dumping," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 11-17, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    18. Richardson, Martin & Stähler, Frank, 2019. "International agreements, economic sovereignty and exit," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    19. Ludema, Rodney D., 2001. "Optimal international trade agreements and dispute settlement procedures," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 355-376, June.
    20. Jee-Hyeong Park, 2004. "Sustaining Free Trade with Imperfect Private Information about Non-Tariff Barriers," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 736, Econometric Society.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:intecj:v:14:y:2000:i:4:p:103-123. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/RIEJ20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.