The international policy coordination to reduce the financial volatility in north East Asia

This paper examines the feasibility of introducing the Tobin tax system to reduce financial volatility in international foreign exchange markets based on the understanding of financial crisis as a self-fulfilling crisis of speculators' belief system. Based on a model analysis, which assumes a speculator from a third country and two governments competing for capital inflows, this paper demonstrates that a country has a less incentive to deviate from the international policy coordination with respect to the Tobin tax system when the country shows less dependency on financial transaction business in its national income. In addition, when the country is more stable in its current account balance and foreign reserves, it is more likely that the country abides by the policy coordination. Therefore, it is required to offer such incentives as allowing all tax revenues to the collecting governments, when the participating countries are relatively more dependent on the financial transaction business as a source of national income.