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Seeing the Lexus for the Olive Trees? Public Opinion, Economic Interdependence, and Interstate Conflict

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  • Seiki Tanaka
  • Atsushi Tago
  • Kristian Skrede Gleditsch

Abstract

Many scholars argue that economic interdependence and more extensive economic ties between countries decreases the risk of violent conflict between them. However, despite considerable research on the “capitalist peace” at the macro or dyadic level, there has been less attention to its possible individual-level microfoundations or underpinnings. We argue that public perceptions about economic ties with other states and the costs of conflict should influence the expected constraints on the use of force for leaders. Actual high interdependence and potential economic costs may not suffice to create political constraints on the use of force if people are unaware of the degree of interdependence or fail to understand the benefits of trade and the likely economic costs of disruptive conflict. We examine the linkages between individual perceptions about economic interdependence and their views on conflict and peace through a survey experiment, where we ask respondents in Japan about approval for belligerent actions in a territorial dispute with China and varying information about economic ties. Our findings indicate that greater knowledge and information about economic interdependence affects attitudes about territorial disputes and increases support for peaceful solutions with China.

Suggested Citation

  • Seiki Tanaka & Atsushi Tago & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, 2017. "Seeing the Lexus for the Olive Trees? Public Opinion, Economic Interdependence, and Interstate Conflict," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(3), pages 375-396, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:43:y:2017:i:3:p:375-396
    DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1200572
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    1. Bryan Caplan, 2007. "Introduction to The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies," Introductory Chapters, in: The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies, Princeton University Press.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yoshitaka Komiya, 2019. "Casualty sensitivity in Japan: Information underlying certainty and uncertainty," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 22(3), pages 258-276, September.
    2. Robert Urbatsch, 2020. "Trade connections’ effect on European regions’ interest in Brexit," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(1), pages 173-179, March.
    3. Celeste Beesley & Scott Cooper, 2023. "Micro-foundations of the commercial peace: The effect of net exports on Ukrainian attitudes towards war with Russia," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 60(6), pages 951-967, November.

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