IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/ginixx/v37y2011i4p388-413.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Civil War Settlements, Size of Governing Coalition, and Durability of Peace in Post--Civil War States

Author

Listed:
  • Madhav Joshi
  • T. David Mason

Abstract

We examine the ways in which the size of the governing coalition in a post--civil war state affects the durability of the peace. Previous studies relate the durability of the peace to the outcome of the civil war, the extent and forms of power-sharing arrangements, and the role of third-party security guarantors. We argue that the way conflict terminates and the power-sharing agreements between former protagonists structure the composition of governing coalition in the post--civil war state. Any settlement to civil war that broadens the size of the governing coalition should increase actors' incentives to sustain the peace rather than renew the armed conflict. Peace is more likely to fail where the governing coalition is smaller because those excluded from the governing coalition have little to lose from resuming armed rebellion. To test these propositions, we analyze data on post--civil war peace spells from 1946--2005.

Suggested Citation

  • Madhav Joshi & T. David Mason, 2011. "Civil War Settlements, Size of Governing Coalition, and Durability of Peace in Post--Civil War States," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(4), pages 388-413, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:4:p:388-413
    DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.622645
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2011.622645
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/03050629.2011.622645?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sabine C Carey & Belén González, 2021. "The legacy of war: The effect of militias on postwar repression," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(3), pages 247-269, May.
    2. Haass, Felix & Ottmann, Martin, 2017. "Profits from Peace: The Political Economy of Power-Sharing and Corruption," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 60-74.
    3. Krista Wiegand & Eric Keels, 2019. "Oil Wealth, Winning Coalitions, and Duration of Civil Wars," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(4), pages 1077-1105, April.
    4. Felix Haass, 2021. "The democracy dilemma. Aid, power-sharing governments, and post-conflict democratization," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(2), pages 200-223, March.
    5. Eric Keels, 2017. "Oil Wealth, Post-conflict Elections, and Postwar Peace Failure," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(5), pages 1021-1045, May.
    6. Madhav Joshi & Jason Michael Quinn, 2020. "Civil war termination and foreign direct investment, 1989–2012," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(4), pages 451-470, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:37:y:2011:i:4:p:388-413. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/GINI20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.