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The Dynamics of Bargaining and War

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  • Darren Filson
  • Suzanne Werner

Abstract

Filson and Werner (2002) introduce a formal model of bargaining and war to explore conditions under which states that can negotiate settlements choose to initiate and terminate violence. Filson and Werner (2004) apply the model to obtain testable hypotheses about the impact of regime type on war onset, duration, and outcomes. The model could provide a basis for a formal rational actor model of power transition with economic and political variables. However, additional dynamic structure would have to be added; Filson and Werner (2002, 2004) focus on simple environments. In this paper we begin to consider more complex dynamic environments using computational techniques. In doing so, we explore the conditions under which wars endure. The results clarify how the initial distribution of resources (power) and benefits, beliefs, and regime type affect whether wars begin, how quickly they end, and what deals are made.

Suggested Citation

  • Darren Filson & Suzanne Werner, 2007. "The Dynamics of Bargaining and War," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(1), pages 31-50, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:33:y:2007:i:1:p:31-50
    DOI: 10.1080/03050620601155656
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
    2. Robert Powell, 2004. "Bargaining and Learning While Fighting," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(2), pages 344-361, April.
    3. Darren Filson & Suzanne Werner, 2004. "Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(2), pages 296-313, April.
    4. Powell, Robert, 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 169-203, January.
    5. Suzanne Werner, 1998. "Negotiating the Terms of Settlement," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(3), pages 321-343, June.
    6. Walter, Barbara F., 1997. "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 335-364, July.
    7. Fortna, Virginia Page, 2003. "Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 337-372, April.
    8. Alastair Smith & Allan C. Stam, 2004. "Bargaining and the Nature of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(6), pages 783-813, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. John Tyson Chatagnier, 2015. "Conflict bargaining as a signal to third parties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(2), pages 237-268, April.

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