IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/ginixx/v31y2005i1p1-14.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Reciprocity in Asymmetry: When Does Reciprocity Work?

Author

Listed:
  • Chae-Han Kim

Abstract

The impact of reciprocity on mutual cooperation in asymmetric situations has been inadequately studied. Asymmetry can include both preference differences and power imbalances. Distinguishing between the conditions under which reciprocity yields a desirable outcome and those under which it does not, the following are suggested: First, if mutual cooperation is preferable to unilateral defection and unrequited cooperation is preferred to mutual defection then cooperate is always the preferred course of action. Secondly, if an actor believes that their opponent will not cooperate but mutual defection represents the worst outcome then unrequited cooperation is the probably outcome. Third, reciprocity is recommended 1) when mutual cooperation represents the best outcome while unrequited cooperation is the worst outcome, 2) when both parties prefer mutual cooperation to mutual defection and both prefer mutual defection to unrequited cooperation, or 3) when the opponent surely prefers mutual cooperation most. These suggestions with the exception of unilateral concession can be inferred from symmetric payoff structures. The theories of reciprocity based on symmetry can be extended to asymmetry with some restrictions. This has some implications in controversies over soft power or coercion. This work was supported by a research grant from Hallym University, Korea.

Suggested Citation

  • Chae-Han Kim, 2005. "Reciprocity in Asymmetry: When Does Reciprocity Work?," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(1), pages 1-14, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:31:y:2005:i:1:p:1-14
    DOI: 10.1080/03050620590919371
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050620590919371
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/03050620590919371?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Chae-Han Kim, 2007. "Explaining Interstate Trust/Distrust in Triadic Relations," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(4), pages 423-439, November.
    2. Yasemin Akbaba & Patrick James & Zeynep Taydas, 2006. "One-Sided Crises in World Politics: A Study of Oxymoron, Violence and Outcomes," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(3), pages 229-260, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:31:y:2005:i:1:p:1-14. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/GINI20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.