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Rational Choice and the Price of Marriage

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  • Robert Cherry

Abstract

This paper accepts the thesis that marriage decisions reflect rational behavior based on weighing benefits and costs. It develops a concept of a marriage price that measures the excess services one spouse provides to the other when there are differences in the number of men and women seeking marriage partners. This price includes income, time allocation to household activities, and control over forms of intimacy and beauty styles. In contrast to Grossbard-Shechtman's strict choice model, this model highlights the patriarchal privileges of husbands. It identifies some of the factors which affect marriage price in the United States and assesses the impact of recent U.S. governmental initiatives to increase marriage rates, including the male employment proposals made by William Julius Wilson. The theoretical model developed here shows that proposals that increase the personal value women place on marriage raise the marriage price they must pay, as well as increasing marriage rates.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Cherry, 1998. "Rational Choice and the Price of Marriage," Feminist Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(1), pages 27-49.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:femeco:v:4:y:1998:i:1:p:27-49
    DOI: 10.1080/135457098338545
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nelson, Julie A, 1994. "I, Thou, and Them: Capabilities, Altruism, and Norms in the Economics of Marriage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 126-131, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Grossbard-Shechtman, Shoshana, 2003. "A consumer theory with competitive markets for work in marriage," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 609-645.
    2. Shoshana Grossbard, 2006. "The New Home Economics at Columbia and Chicago," Springer Books, in: Shoshana Grossbard (ed.), Jacob Mincer A Pioneer of Modern Labor Economics, chapter 7, pages 37-49, Springer.
    3. Shoshana Grossbard & Sankar Mukhopadhyay, 2017. "Marriage markets as explanation for why heavier people work more hours," IZA Journal of Labor Economics, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 6(1), pages 1-30, December.
    4. Jennifer Olmsted, 2002. "Assessing the Impact of Religion on Gender Status," Feminist Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(3), pages 99-111.

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