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Household Bargaining Over Wealth And The Adequacy Of Women'S Retirement Incomes In New Zealand

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  • John Gibson
  • Trinh Le
  • Grant Scobie

Abstract

Bargaining models of household wealth accumulation point to a potential conflict of interest between husbands and wives. Wives are typically younger than their husbands and have longer life expectancy, so they must expect to finance a longer retirement period. Therefore, when they have greater relative bargaining power, households will accumulate more wealth. There is some weak evidence for this in the United States, but this article finds the opposite pattern in New Zealand, where women's greater bargaining power results in a lower net worth in the pre-retirement cohort of couples. In New Zealand, where public pensions are more generous than in the US and are not affected by holdings of private wealth or income, it may not be rational for women with greater relative bargaining power than their spouses to favor wealth accumulation. These results indicate the importance of the policy context when considering household bargaining models.

Suggested Citation

  • John Gibson & Trinh Le & Grant Scobie, 2006. "Household Bargaining Over Wealth And The Adequacy Of Women'S Retirement Incomes In New Zealand," Feminist Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(1-2), pages 221-246.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:femeco:v:12:y:2006:i:1-2:p:221-246
    DOI: 10.1080/13545700500508536
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lundberg, Shelly & Startza, Richard & Stillman, Steven, 2003. "The retirement-consumption puzzle: a marital bargaining approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1199-1218, May.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marieka Klawitter, 2008. "The effects of sexual orientation and marital status on how couples hold their money," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 423-446, December.
    2. Sierminska, Eva M. & Frick, Joachim R. & Grabka, Markus M., 2010. "Examining the gender wealth gap," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 62(4), pages 669-690.
    3. Anglade, Boaz & Useche, Pilar & Deere, Carmen Diana, 2017. "Decomposing the Gender Wealth Gap in Ecuador," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 19-31.
    4. Duc Hong Vo & Phuong Doan Ho & Chi Minh Ho & Michael McAleer, 2019. "The Gender Wealth Gap by Household Head in Vietnam," Advances in Decision Sciences, Asia University, Taiwan, vol. 23(3), pages 122-153, September.
    5. Sierminska, Eva & Frick, Joachim R. & Grabka, Markus M., 2008. "Examining the Gender Wealth Gap in Germany," IZA Discussion Papers 3573, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Aylit Romm, 2015. "The Effect of Retirement Date Expectations on Pre-retirement Wealth Accumulation: The Role of Gender and Bargaining Power in Married US Households," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 36(4), pages 593-605, December.
    7. repec:zbw:rwirep:0258 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Matthias Keese, 2011. "Thrifty Wives and Lavish Husbands? – Bargaining Power and Financial Dicisions in Germany," Ruhr Economic Papers 0258, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    9. Erin Ruel & Robert Hauser, 2013. "Explaining the Gender Wealth Gap," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 50(4), pages 1155-1176, August.
    10. Catherine Weiss & Debra Parkinson & Alyssa Duncan, 2015. "Living Longer on Less," SAGE Open, , vol. 5(3), pages 21582440155, July.
    11. Marcela PARADA‐CONTZEN, 2023. "Gender, family status and health characteristics: Understanding retirement inequalities in the Chilean pension model," International Labour Review, International Labour Organization, vol. 162(2), pages 271-303, June.
    12. Fernandes, Inês & Schmidt, Tobias, 2021. "Household bargaining, pension contributions and retirement expectations: Evidence from the German Panel on Household Finances," Discussion Papers 44/2021, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    13. Keese, Matthias, 2011. "Thrifty Wives and Lavish Husbands? – Bargaining Power and Financial Dicisions in Germany," Ruhr Economic Papers 258, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining; intrahousehold; pensions; retirement; wealth; JEL Codes: D31; J16; J26;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies

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