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The Stewardship Role of Analyst Forecasts, and Discretionary Versus Non-discretionary Accruals

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  • Peter O. Christensen
  • Hans Frimor
  • Florin Sabac

Abstract

We examine the interaction between discretionary and non-discretionary accruals in a stewardship setting. Contracting includes multiple rounds of renegotiation based on contractible accounting information and non-contractible but more timely non-accounting information. We show that accounting regulation aimed at increasing earnings quality from a valuation perspective (earnings persistence) may have a significant impact on how firms rationally respond in terms of allowing accrual discretion in order to alleviate the impact on the stewardship role of earnings. Increasing the precision of more timely non-accounting information (analyst earnings forecasts) increases the ex ante value of the firm and reduces costly earnings management. There is an optimal level of reversible non-discretionary accrual noise introduced through revenue recognition policies. Tight rules-based accounting regulation, as opposed to leaving firms more choice over non-discretionary accrual policies, may lead firms to rationally respond by inducing costly earnings management. More generally, regulating both earnings persistence and the tightness of admissible auditing policies may not result in less equilibrium earnings management.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter O. Christensen & Hans Frimor & Florin Sabac, 2013. "The Stewardship Role of Analyst Forecasts, and Discretionary Versus Non-discretionary Accruals," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(2), pages 257-296, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:euract:v:22:y:2013:i:2:p:257-296
    DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2012.686590
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Konrad Lang, 2018. "Voluntary Disclosure and Analyst Forecast," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(1), pages 23-36, January.
    2. Samudhram, Ananda & Stewart, Errol & Wickramanayake, Jayasinghe & Sinnakkannu, Jothee, 2014. "Value relevance of human capital based disclosures: Moderating effects of labor productivity, investor sentiment, analyst coverage and audit quality," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 338-353.
    3. Athavale, Manoj & Guo, Zhaorui & Meng, Yun & Zhang, Tianshu, 2022. "Diversity of signing auditors and audit quality: Evidence from capital market in China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 554-571.
    4. Li, Wanyun, 2022. "Disclosure of internal control material weaknesses and optimism in analyst earnings forecasts," International Journal of Accounting Information Systems, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).
    5. Ralf Ewert & Alfred Wagenhofer, 2015. "Economic Relations Among Earnings Quality Measures," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 51(3), pages 311-355, September.
    6. Peter O. Christensen & Hans Frimor & Florin Şabac, 2020. "Real Incentive Effects of Soft Information," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(1), pages 514-541, March.
    7. Tim Hensel & Jens Robert Schöndube, 2022. "Big bath accounting and CEO turnover: the interplay between optimal contracts and career concerns," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 92(8), pages 1249-1281, October.
    8. Jonathan Glover & Carolyn B. Levine, 2019. "Information Asymmetries about Measurement Quality," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(1), pages 50-71, March.
    9. Baschieri, Giulia & Carosi, Andrea & Mengoli, Stefano, 2016. "Does the earnings quality matter? Evidence from a quasi-experimental setting," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(C), pages 146-157.

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