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Accounting Policies in Agencies with Moral Hazard and Renegotiation

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  • Peter Ove Christensen
  • Joel S. Demski
  • Hans Frimor

Abstract

We emphasize the role of accounting policies, and their audit, in an earnings management setting. We use a two–period agency in which three frictions interact: the agent privately observes action (or effort) supply and output, and the initial contract is subject to renegotiation. This creates a setting in which both players’ behavior is of concern, and, importantly, information rationing is efficient. Moreover, this information rationing is directly interpretable as being produced by an accounting policy whose application is ensured by an auditor.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Ove Christensen & Joel S. Demski & Hans Frimor, 2002. "Accounting Policies in Agencies with Moral Hazard and Renegotiation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(4), pages 1071-1090, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:40:y:2002:i:4:p:1071-1090
    DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.00082
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    Cited by:

    1. Alfred Wagenhofer, 2014. "Trading off Costs and Benefits of Frequent Financial Reporting," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 389-401, May.
    2. Georges Dionne & Florence Giuliano & Pierre Picard, 2009. "Optimal Auditing with Scoring: Theory and Application to Insurance Fraud," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(1), pages 58-70, January.
    3. Sabac, Florin, 2008. "Dynamic incentives and retirement," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 172-200, September.
    4. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Guay, Wayne R. & Weber, Joseph P., 2010. "The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 179-234, December.
    5. Michael Gibbins & Susan A. McCracken & Steve E. Salterio, 2007. "The Chief Financial Officer's Perspective on Auditor†Client Negotiations," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 24(2), pages 387-422, June.
    6. Peter O. Christensen & Hans Frimor & Florin Sabac, 2013. "The Stewardship Role of Analyst Forecasts, and Discretionary Versus Non-discretionary Accruals," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(2), pages 257-296, June.
    7. Jens Robert Schöndube, 2007. "Early versus late effort in dynamic agencies with learning about productivity," FEMM Working Papers 07026, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    8. David Hirshleifer & Siew Hong Teoh, 2009. "The Psychological Attraction Approach to Accounting and Disclosure Policy," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 26(4), pages 1067-1090, December.
    9. Peter O. Christensen & Hans Frimor & Florin Şabac, 2020. "Real Incentive Effects of Soft Information," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(1), pages 514-541, March.
    10. Joachim Gassen & Kristina Schwedler, 2010. "The Decision Usefulness of Financial Accounting Measurement Concepts: Evidence from an Online Survey of Professional Investors and their Advisors," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(3), pages 495-509.
    11. Frank B. Gigler & Thomas Hemmer, 2004. "On the Value of Transparency in Agencies with Renegotiation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(5), pages 871-893, December.
    12. Christian Lukas, 2023. "On costless‐renegotiation proofing in binary agency models," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(4), pages 2481-2494, June.
    13. Volker Laux, 2008. "Board Independence and CEO Turnover," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 137-171, March.
    14. Jonathan Glover & Carolyn B. Levine, 2019. "Information Asymmetries about Measurement Quality," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(1), pages 50-71, March.
    15. Katolnik, Svetlana & Kukec, Sandra K. & Schöndube, Jens Robert, 2015. "Board Incentives and Board Independence in Dynamic Agency," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-567, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    16. Florin c{S}abac, 2007. "Dynamic Agency with Renegotiation and Managerial Tenure," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(5), pages 849-864, May.
    17. Joel S. Demski, 2003. "Corporate Conflicts of Interest," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(2), pages 51-72, Spring.
    18. Anil Arya & Jonathan Glover & Pierre Jinghong Liang, 2004. "Intertemporal aggregation and incentives," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(4), pages 643-657.
    19. Christensen, Peter O. & Feltham, Gerald A. & Sabac, Florin, 2003. "Dynamic incentives and responsibility accounting: a comment," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 423-436, August.
    20. Christensen, Peter O. & Feltham, Gerald A. & Sabac, Florin, 2005. "A contracting perspective on earnings quality," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 265-294, June.

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