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The economic policy of acquiring foreign currency in wartime: The example of Croatia

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  • Maria Hedvall

Abstract

This paper attempts to describe the methods employed by the Croatian government in order to acquire the foreign currency which was essential for strategic imports during the period 1991-1995. The starting point for this was the fact that foreign currency was in the hands of Croatian households, export companies, and Croatian companies abroad. The Croatian central bank gained access to households' foreign currency principally by gaining their confidence. It gained access to companies' currency by means of “export rights”, and perhaps also as a result of the integration of political and economic positions which was a relic of the former Yugoslavia.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Hedvall, 1999. "The economic policy of acquiring foreign currency in wartime: The example of Croatia," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(1), pages 103-116.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:10:y:1999:i:1:p:103-116
    DOI: 10.1080/10430719908404918
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lindbeck, A., 1994. "Welfare State Disincentives with Endogenous Habits and Norms," Papers 589, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    2. repec:bla:scandj:v:97:y:1995:i:4:p:477-94 is not listed on IDEAS
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