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Taming the City? Ideas, Structural Power and the Evolution of British Banking Policy Amidst the Great Financial Meltdown

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  • Stephen Bell
  • Andrew Hindmoor

Abstract

We are increasingly learning more about the contingencies and independent variables that shape the structural power of business and financial interests. This paper contributes to this research by analysing factors that led to weakening in the structural power of financial interests in the City of London in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 crisis. We focus on under-researched mediators of structural power dynamics, especially the context of action and the agency and ideas of state leaders. Prior to the crisis, closed regulatory policy and a prevailing discourse premised upon the notion of market efficiency, helped to reinforce the structural power of the UK banking and financial sector. After the crisis heightened politicisation, more assertive state leadership, and especially ideational revision, has increasingly challenged the power of the City. We illustrate this through an examination of the Independent Commission on Banking's proposals in relation to the 'ring fencing' of investment and retail banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Bell & Andrew Hindmoor, 2015. "Taming the City? Ideas, Structural Power and the Evolution of British Banking Policy Amidst the Great Financial Meltdown," New Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(3), pages 454-474, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:cnpexx:v:20:y:2015:i:3:p:454-474
    DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2014.951426
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Culpepper,Pepper D., 2011. "Quiet Politics and Business Power," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521118590, October.
    2. Culpepper,Pepper D., 2011. "Quiet Politics and Business Power," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521134132, October.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Young Kevin, 2015. "Not by structure alone: power, prominence, and agency in American finance," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(3), pages 443-472, October.
    3. Chwieroth, Jeffrey M. & Walter, Andrew, 2019. "The financialization of mass wealth, banking crises and politics over the long run," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 100765, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Chwieroth, Jeffrey & Walter, Andrew, 2020. "Great expectations, financialization and bank bailouts in democracies," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 102749, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Di Johnson & John Rodwell & Thomas Hendry, 2021. "Analyzing the Impacts of Financial Services Regulation to Make the Case That Buy-Now-Pay-Later Regulation Is Failing," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-20, February.
    6. Chwieroth, Jeffrey M. & Walter, Andrew, 2022. "Neoliberalism and banking crisis bailouts: distant enemies or warring neighbors?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 111871, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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