Between Ankara and Jerusalem: the Armenian Genocide as a Zero-Sum Game in Israel's Foreign Policy (1980’s -2010’s)

This article examines the historical and symbiotic relationship between Israel’s foreign policy and its domestic political and cultural arena in respect to the Armenian Genocide as being like a zero-sum game. The article argues that for more than three decades (1980s‒2010s) the Israeli policy on the Armenian Genocide has been mainly dependent on low degree of domestic pressure, specifically lack of substantial parliamentary pressure by opposition parties, on successive Israeli governments to recognize the genocide. This has made it easier for Israel to come to economic, military and arms trading agreements with Turkey and, in recent years, with Azerbaijan. Successive Turkish governments, meanwhile, have known both that Israel’s executive forces have been facing a low degree of parliamentary pressure to recognize the genocide domestically, and have used this knowledge to put their own pressure on Israel regarding the issue of recognition, pushing it to be tougher domestically to silence the campaign.