Path-dependent Patterns for the Discrepancy Between the Constitutional and Factual Power of Presidents after 1989

Looking at the development of different countries in Eastern Europe, Central Europe, and the Baltic States following the collapse of state socialism, institutions like the presidency are of considerable relevance as an explanatory factor when analyzing processes of regime transformation. During the process of democratization, the presidential institution is affected by a variety of alterations: at the time when institutions adapt to the real circumstances of politics. Presidents have the choice either to accept the new structures or to decline and try to change them. Although we can observe completely different processes of democratization, when comparing presidents, it appears that the described difference in presidential behavior compared to the constitutional rules follows certain patterns. With the evidence gathered so far, it seems that the duration of democratic consolidation and historical-institutional pre-conditioning influence this path-dependent occurrence. Pre-autocratic experiences, experiences with autocratic regimes and the specific end of the autocratic regime have great influence on the following process. Focusing on this, this research will make a contribution to the question of the role of top-down actors in the consolidation period after 1989, especially in former European patrimonial communist regimes.