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Large and entangled: Italian business groups in the long run

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  • Andrea Colli
  • Michelangelo Vasta

Abstract

This article, by using both a qualitative and quantitative approach, focuses on large business groups (BGs) in Italy. It provides a methodology of analysis which aims at re-constructing the boundaries and the relevance of BGs in a national economy in the long-run, identifying a country-specific taxonomy of both their forms and the rationales (logics) for their existence. By adopting an original methodology, that is the network analysis, and by using a large and comprehensive dataset (Imita.db), this article also provides some proxy measures of the relevance of the largest BGs in the Italian economy, something which has never been done before in Italian business history research. The analysis clearly shows the persistence of large and entangled BGs in the Italian economy. It confirms that this particular form of business organisation is neither limited to the less developed countries, nor is simply a second best functional substitute of the multi-divisional form diffused in the liberal market economies. Finally, this article also suggests a research itinerary which can also be fruitfully applied in business history to other specific cases.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea Colli & Michelangelo Vasta, 2015. "Large and entangled: Italian business groups in the long run," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 57(1), pages 64-96, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:bushst:v:57:y:2015:i:1:p:64-96
    DOI: 10.1080/00076791.2014.977872
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marco Becht & Colin Mayer, 2002. "Corporate control in Europe," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 112(4), pages 471-498.
    2. Barca, Fabrizio & Becht, Marco (ed.), 2001. "The Control of Corporate Europe," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199247424.
    3. Whittington, Richard & Mayer, Michael, 2000. "The European Corporation: Strategy, Structure, and Social Science," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199242085.
    4. Marco Becht & Fabrizio Barca, 2001. "The control of corporate Europe," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/13302, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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    1. Jeoung Yul Lee & Asli M. Colpan & Yeon-Sik Ryu & Tomoki Sekiguchi, 2022. "What do we know about the internationalization of Asian business groups? A systematic review and future research agenda," Asian Business & Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(5), pages 802-830, November.

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