Banking deregulation and allocative efficiency in Pakistan

This article examines the impact of deregulation policies on allocative efficiency of banks in Pakistan. It investigates whether deregulation has impacted the pattern of allocative efficiency of banks and explores which bank ownership segment has been more responsive. It uses data from 1991 to 2005 and explicitly models allocative inefficiency by using the translog shadow cost-share system. Empirical results show that overregulation and imperfect market structure hampers the ability of banks to make competitive decisions. We find evidence of allocative inefficiency leading to over-utilization of labour and deposits vis-à-vis operating cost. Empirical results for time-varying allocative efficiency show declining levels of allocative inefficiency for state-owned and private banks in post-reform period. Deregulation policies induce state-owned banks to decrease over-utilization of labour relative to deposits and operating cost while private banks succeed in using operating cost closer to optimal levels. Hence, policymakers have latitude to introduce more reforms without jeopardizing allocative efficiency.