IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/apmtfi/v7y2000i2p115-125.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Estimating fees for managed futures: a continuous-time model with a knockout feature

Author

Listed:
  • Francisca Richter
  • B. Wade Brorsen

Abstract

Past research regarding incentive fees based on high-water marks has developed models for the specific characteristics of hedge funds. These theoretical models have used either discrete time or a Black-Scholes type differential equation. However, for managed futures, high-water marks are measured more frequently than for hedge funds, so a continuous-time model for managed futures may be appropriate. A knockout feature is added to a continuous model, which is something unique to managed futures although it could also have some relevance to hedge funds. The procedures allow one to derive the distribution function for the fund's survival time, which has not been derived in past research. The distribution of the maximum until ruin is derived as well, and used to provide an estimate of expected incentive fees. An estimate of the expected fixed fee is also obtained. The model shows that the expected incentive fee would be maximized if all funds were invested in margins, but for total fees to be maximized in the presence of a knockout feature, less than half of the funds should be invested. This is precisely what fund managers do. This result suggests that designing a fund with incentive fees only may cause fund managers to adopt the highest leverage, and thus, highest risk possible.

Suggested Citation

  • Francisca Richter & B. Wade Brorsen, 2000. "Estimating fees for managed futures: a continuous-time model with a knockout feature," Applied Mathematical Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(2), pages 115-125.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apmtfi:v:7:y:2000:i:2:p:115-125
    DOI: 10.1080/13504860010011163
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13504860010011163
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/13504860010011163?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stephen Brown & William Goetzmann & James Park, 1998. "Conditions for Survival: Changing Risk and the Performance of Hedge Fund Managers and CTAs," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm83, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Apr 2008.
    2. William N. Goetzmann & Jonathan Ingersoll, Jr. & Stephen A. Ross, 1998. "High Water Marks," NBER Working Papers 6413, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Mark Grinblatt & Sheridan Titman, 1989. "Adverse Risk Incentives and the Design of Performance-Based Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 35(7), pages 807-822, July.
    4. Jennifer Carpenter, 1997. "The Optimal Dynamic Investment Policy for a Fund Manager Compensated with an Incentive Fee," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 97-11, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. A. Harri & B. W. Brorsen, 2004. "Performance persistence and the source of returns for hedge funds," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(2), pages 131-141.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Stephen Brown & William Goetzmann & James Park, 1998. "Conditions for Survival: Changing Risk and the Performance of Hedge Fund Managers and CTAs," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm83, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Apr 2008.
    2. Palomino, Frederic & Prat, Andrea, 2003. "Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 113-137, Spring.
    3. Getmansky, Mila & Lo, Andrew W. & Makarov, Igor, 2004. "An econometric model of serial correlation and illiquidity in hedge fund returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 529-609, December.
    4. Juan-Pedro Gómez & Tridib Sharma, 2006. "Portfolio delegation under short-selling constraints," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(1), pages 173-196, May.
    5. Franklin R. Edward, 1999. "Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Capital Management," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 189-210, Spring.
    6. Livio Stracca, 2006. "Delegated Portfolio Management: A Survey Of The Theoretical Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 823-848, December.
    7. Cuoco, Domenico & Kaniel, Ron, 2011. "Equilibrium prices in the presence of delegated portfolio management," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 264-296, August.
    8. Cao, Jie & Han, Bing & Wang, Qinghai, 2017. "Institutional Investment Constraints and Stock Prices," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 465-489, April.
    9. Anil Aswani & Zuo-Jun Max Shen & Auyon Siddiq, 2019. "Data-Driven Incentive Design in the Medicare Shared Savings Program," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 67(4), pages 1002-1026, July.
    10. Detemple, Jerome & Sundaresan, Suresh, 1999. "Nontraded Asset Valuation with Portfolio Constraints: A Binomial Approach," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(4), pages 835-872.
    11. Ana C. Díaz†Mendoza & Germán López†Espinosa & Miguel A. Martínez, 2014. "The Efficiency of Performance†Based Fee Funds," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 20(4), pages 825-855, September.
    12. Servaes, Henri & Sigurdsson, Kari, 2022. "The Costs and Benefits of Performance Fees in Mutual Funds," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
    13. Stephen J. Brown & William N. Goetzmann & Bing Liang, 2005. "Fees On Fees In Funds Of Funds," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: H Gifford Fong (ed.), The World Of Hedge Funds Characteristics and Analysis, chapter 7, pages 141-160, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    14. Lim, Terence & Lo, Andrew W. & Merton, Robert C. & Scholes, Myron S., 2006. "The Derivatives Sourcebook," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 1(5–6), pages 365-572, April.
    15. Suleyman Basak & Anna Pavlova & Alexander Shapiro, 2007. "Optimal Asset Allocation and Risk Shifting in Money Management," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 20(5), pages 1583-1621, 2007 21.
    16. Athanasios Orphanides, "undated". "Compensation Incentives and Risk Taking Behavior: Evidence from Mutual Funds," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1996-21, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), revised 10 Dec 2019.
    17. Bill Ding & Hany A. Shawky, 2007. "The Performance of Hedge Fund Strategies and the Asymmetry of Return Distributions," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 13(2), pages 309-331, March.
    18. Balmus, Tatiana & Huber, Juergen & Ploner, Matteo, 2020. "More competition in delegated portfolio management: A win-win situation? An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 777-800.
    19. repec:onb:oenbwp:y:2005:i:9:b:1 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Andrew Metrick, 2010. "The Economics of Private Equity Funds," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(6), pages 2303-2341, June.
    21. Gaurav S. Amin & Harry M. Kat, 2001. "Welcome to the Dark Side - Hedge Fund Attrition and Survivorship Bias over the period 1994-2001," ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance icma-dp2002-02, Henley Business School, University of Reading, revised Jan 2002.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:apmtfi:v:7:y:2000:i:2:p:115-125. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/RAMF20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.