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The financial performance of companies acquiring very large takeover targets

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  • R. A. Chatterjee

Abstract

Empirical evaluations of the theory of disciplinary takeover during the 1970s concluded that whilst very unprofitable companies experienced a somewhat higher probability of takeover than average, it was company size which acted as the most powerful discriminator between taken-over firms and others. In particular, very large firms were relatively immune from takeover and would therefore be relatively unrestrained by the market for corporate control. However, during the 1980s, financial innovations (e.g. junk bonds in the US and mezzanine debt in the UK) enabled companies to overcome traditional obstacles in the financial markets and acquire very large targets. This paper focuses upon some of the largest taken-over companies during the 1977-90 period and analyses the performance of acquirers of these companies using Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) and accounting profit. Since these very large targets had been sheltered from the threat of takeover, they may well have developed specially large x inefficiency. The paper therefore asks whether such takeovers yield specially large performance improvements.

Suggested Citation

  • R. A. Chatterjee, 2000. "The financial performance of companies acquiring very large takeover targets," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(2), pages 185-191.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apfiec:v:10:y:2000:i:2:p:185-191
    DOI: 10.1080/096031000331824
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Fischer, Mario, 2017. "The source of financing in mergers and acquisitions," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 227-239.
    2. Athanasios Tsagkanos & Evangelos Koumanakos & Antonios Georgopoulos & Costas Siriopoulos, 2012. "Prediction of Greek takeover targets via bootstrapping on mixed logit model," Review of Accounting and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 11(3), pages 315-334, August.
    3. Sarah Osborne & Dean Katselas & Larelle Chapple, 2012. "The preferences of private equity investors in selecting target acquisitions: An international investigation," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 37(3), pages 361-389, December.
    4. Martynova, M. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2005. "Takeover Waves : Triggers, Performance and Motives," Other publications TiSEM ed134639-33ef-4720-9935-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Martynova, M., 2006. "The market for corporate control and corporate governance regulation in Europe," Other publications TiSEM 8651e281-4914-41f2-ac14-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Abhay Abhyankar & Keng-Yu Ho & Huainan Zhao, 2005. "Long-run post-merger stock performance of UK acquiring firms: a stochastic dominance perspective," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(10), pages 679-690.
    7. Athanasios Tsagkanos & Antonios Georgopoulos & Costas Siriopoulos & Evangelos Koumanakos, 2008. "Identification of Greek Takeover Targets and Coherent Policy Implications," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 180-192, February.
    8. Sarah Osborne, 2020. "Abnormal returns and asymmetric information surrounding strategic and financial acquisitions," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(4), pages 3991-4030, December.
    9. Hoa Luong & Abeyratna Gunasekarage & Syed Shams, 2021. "CEO pay slice and acquisitions in Australia: the role of tournament incentives," International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 18(5), pages 833-868, September.
    10. Martynova, Marina & Renneboog, Luc, 2008. "A century of corporate takeovers: What have we learned and where do we stand?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(10), pages 2148-2177, October.
    11. M. Mark Walker & Chi-Sheng Hsu, 2007. "Strategic objectives, industry structure and the long-term stock price performance of acquiring and rival firms," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(15), pages 1233-1244.
    12. Becht, Marco & Bolton, Patrick & Roell, Ailsa, 2003. "Corporate governance and control," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 1-109, Elsevier.
    13. Rao-Nicholson, Rekha & Salaber, Julie & Cao, Tuan Hiep, 2016. "Long-term performance of mergers and acquisitions in ASEAN countries," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 373-387.
    14. Shams, Syed M.M. & Gunasekarage, Abeyratna, 2016. "Operating performance following corporate acquisitions: Does the organisational form of the target matter?," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 1-14.
    15. G. Capece & Di Pillo Francesca & N. Levialdi & G. Perrotta, 2017. "Understanding How the Strategic Similarities between Energy Companies Influence the Post-mergers and Acquisitions Performances," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 7(1), pages 78-89.

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