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A delegated agent in a winner-takes-all contest

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  • Lambert Schoonbeek

Abstract

A standard winner-takes-all rent-seeking contest with a principal-agent relationship is extended. One of the two players offers a contract to an agent to act as a delegate on his behalf. The wage offered to the agent is deliberately chosen. The equilibrium of the extended contest is characterized.

Suggested Citation

  • Lambert Schoonbeek, 2002. "A delegated agent in a winner-takes-all contest," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(1), pages 21-23.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:9:y:2002:i:1:p:21-23
    DOI: 10.1080/13504850110049333
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kooreman, Peter & Schoonbeek, Lambert, 1997. "The specification of the probability functions in Tullock's rent-seeking contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 59-61, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A. & Muller, Wieland, 2001. "Divisionalization in contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 89-93, January.
    2. Rusche, Christian, 2011. "Does Delegation Help to Prevent Spiteful Behavior?," Ruhr Economic Papers 270, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    3. Gürtler, Oliver, 2006. "Contractual Incentive Provision and Commitment in Rent-Seeking Contests," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 100, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    4. Kyung Hwan Baik, 2007. "Equilibrium Contingent Compensation in Contests with Delegation," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 73(4), pages 986-1002, April.
    5. Krakel, Matthias & Sliwka, Dirk, 2006. "Strategic delegation and mergers in oligopolistic contests," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 119-136.
    6. Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2004. "Delegation in a group-contest," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 263-272, March.
    7. Kyung Hwan Baik & Jong Hwa Lee, 2013. "Endogenous Timing In Contests With Delegation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(4), pages 2044-2055, October.
    8. repec:zbw:rwirep:0270 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Byung In Lim & Jason Shogren, 2004. "Unilateral delegation and reimbursement systems in an environmental conflict," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(8), pages 489-493.
    10. Lambert Schoonbeek, 2017. "Information And Endogenous Delegation In A Rent-Seeking Contest," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(3), pages 1497-1510, July.
    11. Park Sung-Hoon & Lee Sanghack, 2020. "Legal Contests with Unilateral Delegation," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-9, April.
    12. Christian Rusche, 2011. "Does Delegation Help to Prevent Spiteful Behavior?," Ruhr Economic Papers 0270, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    13. Vázquez-Sedano Alexis, 2018. "Sharing the Effort Costs in Group Contests," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-21, January.

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