IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/apeclt/v8y2001i2p105-109.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Serial bankruptcy: plan infeasibility or just bad luck?

Author

Listed:
  • Karen Denning
  • Stephen Ferris
  • Robert Lawless

Abstract

Through a comparison of serial and once bankrupt firms over the period 1970-1996, those factors that lead to a successful reorganization are examined. It is found that serial bankrupt firms generally fail to restructure their top management around the time of their initial reorganization while over 70% of the sample of once bankrupt firms replace their senior executives. Serial bankrupt firms increase their level of fixed payments, are less able to lower their debt coupon rate and issue more equity than their once-bankrupt matches. It is further found that firm growth, performance, liquidity and size are associated with a greater likelihood of a successful reorganization. Firm risk as measured by financial leverage increases the probability of a subsequent bankruptcy. These results are useful to both bankruptcy courts and corporate managers seeking to discriminate between feasible and unrealistic reorganization plans following bankruptcy.

Suggested Citation

  • Karen Denning & Stephen Ferris & Robert Lawless, 2001. "Serial bankruptcy: plan infeasibility or just bad luck?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(2), pages 105-109.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:8:y:2001:i:2:p:105-109
    DOI: 10.1080/13504850150204156
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article&doi=10.1080/13504850150204156&magic=repec&7C&7C8674ECAB8BB840C6AD35DC6213A474B5
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/13504850150204156?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gilson, Stuart C., 1989. "Management turnover and financial distress," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 241-262, December.
    2. Hotchkiss, Edith Shwalb, 1995. "Postbankruptcy Performance and Management Turnover," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(1), pages 3-21, March.
    3. Betker, Brian L, 1995. "Management's Incentives, Equity's Bargaining Power, and Deviations from Absolute Priority in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(2), pages 161-183, April.
    4. Gilson, Stuart C & Vetsuypens, Michael R, 1993. "CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(2), pages 425-458, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Minchoul Kim & Minho Kim & Ronald McNiel, 2008. "Predicting survival prospect of corporate restructuring in Korea," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(15), pages 1187-1190.
    2. Andreas Lehnert & Dean M. Maki, 2002. "Consumption, debt and portfolio choice: testing the effect of bankruptcy law," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2002-14, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dina Naples Layish, 2003. "A Monitoring Role for Deviations from Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Resolution," Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(5), pages 377-410, December.
    2. Umair Bin Yousaf & Khalil Jebran & Irfan Ullah, 2024. "Corporate governance and financial distress: A review of the theoretical and empirical literature," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(2), pages 1627-1679, April.
    3. Beiqi Lin & Chelsea Liu & Kelvin Jui Keng Tan & Qing Zhou, 2020. "CEO turnover and bankrupt firms’ emergence," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(9-10), pages 1238-1267, October.
    4. Lars Schweizer & Andreas Nienhaus, 2017. "Corporate distress and turnaround: integrating the literature and directing future research," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 10(1), pages 3-47, June.
    5. Hülya K. K. Eraslan, 2008. "Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: Estimates From A Bargaining Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(2), pages 659-681, May.
    6. Mara Faccio & Rajdeep Sengupta, 2011. "Corporate response to distress: evidence from the Asian financial crisis," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 93(Mar), pages 127-154.
    7. Eckbo, B. Espen & Thorburn, Karin S. & Wang, Wei, 2016. "How costly is corporate bankruptcy for the CEO?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 210-229.
    8. Jie Chen & Woon Sau Leung & Wei Song & Davide Avino, 2018. "Does CDS trading affect risk-taking incentives in managerial compensation?," Working Papers 2018-19, Swansea University, School of Management.
    9. Lie, Erik & Lie, Heidi J. & McConnell, John J., 2001. "Debt-reducing exchange offers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 179-207, June.
    10. Chatterjee, Sris & Dhillon, Upinder S. & Ramirez, Gabriel G., 1995. "Coercive tender and exchange offers in distressed high-yield debt restructurings An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 333-360, July.
    11. Christine Pochet, 2001. "Le gouvernement de l'entreprise défaillante: étude de trente plans de continuation," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 4(2), pages 149-181, March.
    12. Ahsan Habib & Mabel D' Costa & Hedy Jiaying Huang & Md. Borhan Uddin Bhuiyan & Li Sun, 2020. "Determinants and consequences of financial distress: review of the empirical literature," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(S1), pages 1023-1075, April.
    13. Chan, Chia-Ying & Chou, De-Wai & Lin, Jane-Raung & Liu, Feng-Ying, 2016. "The role of corporate governance in forecasting bankruptcy: Pre- and post-SOX enactment," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 166-188.
    14. Woods, Keegan & Tan, Kelvin Jui Keng & Faff, Robert, 2019. "Labor unions and corporate financial leverage: The bargaining device versus crowding-out hypotheses," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 28-44.
    15. Bharath, Sreedhar T. & Panchapegesan, Venky & Werner, Ingrid, 2007. "The Changing Nature of Chapter 11," Working Paper Series 2008-4, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    16. Cronqvist, Henrik & Makhija, Anil K. & Yonker, Scott E., 2012. "Behavioral consistency in corporate finance: CEO personal and corporate leverage," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 20-40.
    17. Li, Yuanzhi & Zhong, Zhaodong (Ken), 2013. "Investing in Chapter 11 stocks: Trading, value, and performance," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 33-60.
    18. Pryshchepa, Oksana & Aretz, Kevin & Banerjee, Shantanu, 2013. "Can investors restrict managerial behavior in distressed firms?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 222-239.
    19. Sheng Guo & Qiang Kang & Oscar A. Mitnik, 2022. "Dynamics of managerial power and CEO compensation in the course of corporate distress: Evidence from 1992 to 2019," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 51(3), pages 797-825, September.
    20. Isagawa, Nobuyuki, 2006. "Lender's risk incentive and debt concession," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 141-150.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:8:y:2001:i:2:p:105-109. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/RAEL20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.