IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/apeclt/v21y2014i8p564-568.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Powerful CEOs and capital structure decisions: evidence from the CEO pay slice (CPS)

Author

Listed:
  • Pandej Chintrakarn
  • Pornsit Jiraporn
  • Manohar Singh

Abstract

Motivated by agency theory, we explore how powerful CEOs view leverage. Because of the agency conflict, CEOs may adopt sub-optimal leverage levels that promote their own private benefits at the expense of shareholders. Using Bebchuk et al. (2011) CEO pay slice (CPS) to gauge CEO power, we find that powerful CEOs view leverage negatively and avoid high debt. However, CEOs appear to adopt sub-optimal leverage only when their power is sufficiently consolidated. Relatively weak CEOs do not seem to avoid leverage. The effect of CEO power on capital structure decisions is thus nonmonotonic. Our results imply that agency problems lead to self-serving behaviour only when managers command sufficient influence in the company. Finally, we also show that our conclusion is unlikely confounded by endogeneity.

Suggested Citation

  • Pandej Chintrakarn & Pornsit Jiraporn & Manohar Singh, 2014. "Powerful CEOs and capital structure decisions: evidence from the CEO pay slice (CPS)," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(8), pages 564-568, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:21:y:2014:i:8:p:564-568
    DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2013.875102
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13504851.2013.875102
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/13504851.2013.875102?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Riaqa Mubeen & Dongping Han & Jaffar Abbas & Iftikhar Hussain, 2020. "The Effects of Market Competition, Capital Structure, and CEO Duality on Firm Performance: A Mediation Analysis by Incorporating the GMM Model Technique," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(8), pages 1-18, April.
    2. Sanjukta Brahma & Fotini Economou, 2024. "CEO power and corporate strategies: a review of the literature," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 62(3), pages 1069-1143, April.
    3. Shi, Huaizhi, 2024. "Managerial ownership and labor income share," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(PB).
    4. Sheikh, Shahbaz, 2022. "CEO power and the likelihood of paying dividends: Effect of profitability and cash flow volatility," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    5. Qaiser Munir & Tongxia Li, 2018. "Nonlinearity between CEO power and firm leverage: evidence from the threshold model," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 593-620, July.
    6. Zeitun, Rami & Goaied, Mohamed & Refai, Hisham Al, 2022. "Does minority management affect a firm's capital structure? Evidence from Japan," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
    7. Khawaja, Mohsin & Bhatti, M. Ishaq & Ashraf, Dawood, 2019. "Ownership and control in a double decision framework for raising capital," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(C).
    8. Ampofo, Akwasi A. & Barkhi, Reza, 2024. "The impact of CEO power and ethical corporate citizenship on firms’ outcomes," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(PA).
    9. Li, Tongxia & Munir, Qaiser & Abd Karim, Mohd Rahimie, 2017. "Nonlinear relationship between CEO power and capital structure: Evidence from China's listed SMEs," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 1-21.
    10. Huang, Xiaohong & Kabir, Rezaul & Thijssen, Maximiliaan Willem Pierre, 2024. "Powerful female CEOs and the capital structure of firms," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C).
    11. Hammad, Maryam, 2023. "Power to the CEO? Sources of CEO Power and Its Influences on Strategic Choices and Firm Performance," Junior Management Science (JUMS), Junior Management Science e. V., vol. 8(4), pages 827-844.
    12. Munir, Qaiser & Kok, Sook Ching & Teplova, Tamara & Li, Tongxia, 2017. "Powerful CEOs, debt financing, and leasing in Chinese SMEs: Evidence from threshold model," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 487-503.
    13. Chao, Chi Chur & Hu, May & Munir, Qaiser & Li, Tongxia, 2017. "The impact of CEO power on corporate capital structure: New evidence from dynamic panel threshold analysis," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 107-120.
    14. Chintrakarn, Pandej & Jiraporn, Pornsit & Treepongkaruna, Sirimon, 2021. "How do independent directors view corporate social responsibility (CSR) during a stressful time? Evidence from the financial crisis," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 143-160.
    15. Chen, Fu Chen & Indiran, Logaiswari Indiran & Abdul Kohar, Umar Haiyat Abdul Kohar, 2023. "Disruptive Innovation (DI) and Chief Executive Officer(CEO): A synthetic literature review," MPRA Paper 119321, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Oct 2023.
    16. Salman Riaz & Muhammad Saqib Naeem & Rida Liaquat, 2024. "Impact of CEO Characteristics on Financial Conservatism of a Firm: Moderating Role of Macro-Economic Variables," Bulletin of Business and Economics (BBE), Research Foundation for Humanity (RFH), vol. 13(3), pages 130-143.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:21:y:2014:i:8:p:564-568. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/RAEL20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.