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A first experimental test of multilevel game theory: the PD case

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  • Kjell Hausken
  • Andreas Ortmann

Abstract

The prisoner's dilemma (PD) is played by two players in each of two groups. The two groups compete for an external prize whose allocation is determined by the degree of within-group coordination. The experimental evidence supports the predictions of multilevel game theory well.

Suggested Citation

  • Kjell Hausken & Andreas Ortmann, 2007. "A first experimental test of multilevel game theory: the PD case," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(4), pages 261-264.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:15:y:2007:i:4:p:261-264
    DOI: 10.1080/13504850600592457
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Herbert A. Simon, 1955. "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 69(1), pages 99-118.
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    6. Ortmann, Andreas & Tichy, Lisa K., 1999. "Gender differences in the laboratory: evidence from prisoner's dilemma games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 327-339, July.
    7. James Andreoni & John Miller, 2002. "Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 737-753, March.
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