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Regulatory capital: Why is it different?

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  • Dirk Schoenmaker

Abstract

The global financial crisis has highlighted that deviations between the accounting and regulatory concepts of equity capital have gone too far. Accounting standards have been going too far in the application of fair value accounting. If there are no markets during times of crises, it does not make sense to mark-to-market. These exceptions have now been included in the accounting standards. At the same time, regulatory capital has gone astray by allowing debt elements, such as subordinated debt, to be incorporated, which did not absorb losses during the crisis. The new Basel III capital framework is rightfully reinforcing the central role of equity capital. While the special liquidity function of banks may justify lower levels of capital than those of industrial firms, the social cost of bank failures (externalities) requires higher levels than the extremely low levels of bank capital before the crisis. The level of regulatory capital has been increased, with a systemic surcharge for the large banks, to reduce the too-big-to-fail subsidy for these banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Dirk Schoenmaker, 2015. "Regulatory capital: Why is it different?," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(4), pages 468-483, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:acctbr:v:45:y:2015:i:4:p:468-483
    DOI: 10.1080/00014788.2015.1030961
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    1. Velasco, Pilar, 2022. "Is bank diversification a linking channel between regulatory capital and bank value?," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(4).
    2. Sameh Jouida, 2019. "Bank capital structure, capital requirements and SRISK across bank ownership types and financial crisis: panel VAR approach," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 295-325, July.
    3. Philippe Oster, 2020. "Contingent Convertible bond literature review: making everything and nothing possible?," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(4), pages 343-381, December.

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