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The Power of Public Oversight: The Effects of Environmental Agency Information Disclosure on Environmental Investment by Polluting Enterprises

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  • Qiang Fu

Abstract

Collusion between government and business presents a significant challenge to environmental governance, yet academic literature rarely addresses effective measures to address this key problem. This study addresses this gap by leveraging government information disclosure data from urban environmental protection agencies in China to empirically examine the impact of such disclosures on environmental investments by Chinese polluting enterprises. Our analysis reveals the positive effects of government information disclosure by enforcement agencies on environmental investments, particularly for enterprises characterized by higher degrees of government-business collusion. Unlike traditional supervision methods from higher authorities to lower ones, government information disclosure operates under public oversight, which can mitigate shortcomings in supervision scope and agency costs. Thus, the findings of this study offer valuable insights for addressing pollution governance challenges. Â

Suggested Citation

  • Qiang Fu, 2024. "The Power of Public Oversight: The Effects of Environmental Agency Information Disclosure on Environmental Investment by Polluting Enterprises," Advances in Management and Applied Economics, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 14(5), pages 1-9.
    • Handle: RePEc:spt:admaec:v:14:y:2024:i:5:f:14_5_9
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