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Coordinated strategies for economic cooperation between Europe and the United States

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  • Andries Brandsma
  • J. Pijpers

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  • Andries Brandsma & J. Pijpers, 1985. "Coordinated strategies for economic cooperation between Europe and the United States," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 121(4), pages 661-681, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:weltar:v:121:y:1985:i:4:p:661-681
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02705872
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fair, Ray C, 1978. "The Sensitivity of Fiscal Policy Effects to Assumptions about the Behavior of the Federal Reserve," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(5), pages 1165-1179, September.
    2. Kalai, Ehud, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-1630, October.
    3. Miller, Marcus & Salmon, Mark, 1985. "Dynamic Games and the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy in Open Economies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 124-137, Supplemen.
    4. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    5. Richard N. Cooper, 1969. "Macroeconomic Policy Adjustment in Interdependent Economies," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 83(1), pages 1-24.
    6. Barten, A. P. & d'Alcantara, G. & Carrin, G. J., 1976. "COMET : A medium-term macroeconomic model for the European economic community," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 63-115.
    7. Jean-Claude Chouraqui & Robert Price, 1983. "Medium-Term Financial Strategy: The Co-ordination of Fiscal and Monetary Policies," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 9, OECD Publishing.
    8. van der Ploeg, Rick, 1982. "Government policy, real wage resistance and the resolution of conflict," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 181-212.
    9. Brandsma, Andries S. & Hughes Hallett, A. J., 1984. "Economic conflict and the solution of dynamic games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 26(1-2), pages 13-32.
    10. Bert Hickman & Stefan Schleicher, 1978. "The interdependence of national economies and the synchronization of economic fluctuations: Evidence from the LINK project," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 114(4), pages 642-708, December.
    11. Shishido, Shuntaro & Fujiwara, Hironori & Kohno, Akio & Kurokawa, Yuji & Matsuura, Satoshi & Wago, Hajime, 1980. "A model for the coordination of recovery policies in the OECD region," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 35-55, January.
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