IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/telsys/v79y2022i4d10.1007_s11235-021-00872-0.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Property commons for efficient spectrum use

Author

Listed:
  • Vadim Nozdrin

    (International Telecommunication Union)

  • Pavel Mamchenkov

    (OJSC MegaFon)

Abstract

The efficient use of radio spectrum as a valuable natural resource is imperative for the accomplishment of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As the scarcity of resources becomes an ever more pressing problem, the existing management regimes should be improved to achieve the maximum economic benefit for society while respecting existing technical and regulatory restrictions. In the context of radio spectrum, scarcity of resources is not just the result of increasing quantities of radio devices and applications. To a large extent it is the result of ever- growing amounts of data that need to be transmitted wirelessly, thus putting an evolutionary pressure on both technical and operational conditions of spectrum utilization. This paper looks at economic theory for management of natural resources, with a primary focus on the role played by property rights mechanism. It analyses and compares different property rights for spectrum, highlighting their intrinsic advantages and disadvantages, and provides guidelines for a more beneficial choice to facilitate efficient utilisation of spectrum. The paper concludes with a case study related to deploying 5G broadband technology and suggests an introduction of “private commons” as spectrum ownership paradigm in the frequency bands allocated for new generation mobile broadband systems may be the best course of action. Some regulatory steps taken in direction of practical application of this regime in China and Italy are considered.

Suggested Citation

  • Vadim Nozdrin & Pavel Mamchenkov, 2022. "Property commons for efficient spectrum use," Telecommunication Systems: Modelling, Analysis, Design and Management, Springer, vol. 79(4), pages 573-581, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:telsys:v:79:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s11235-021-00872-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s11235-021-00872-0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11235-021-00872-0
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11235-021-00872-0?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    2. Eggertsson,Thrainn, 1990. "Economic Behavior and Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521348911.
    3. Stevenson,Glenn G., 1991. "Common Property Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521384414.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Medeisis, Arturas & Fomin, Vladislav & Webb, William, 2022. "Untangling the paradox of Licensed Shared Access: Need for regulatory refocus," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(8).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Granér, Staffan, 2005. "Thy neighbour’s property. Communal property rights and institutional change in an iron producing forest district of Sweden 1630-1750," Göteborg Papers in Economic History 3, University of Gothenburg, Unit for Economic History.
    2. Jongwook Kim & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2002. "Resource-based and property rights perspectives on value creation: the case of oil field unitization," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(4-5), pages 225-245.
    3. christoph Engel, 2005. "Voice over IP. Competition Policy and Regulation," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2005_26, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    4. Kim, Jongwook & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2008. "A Strategic Theory of the Firm as a Nexus of Incomplete Contracts: A Property Rights Approach," Working Papers 08-0108, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    5. Caballero-Miguez, Gonzalo & Fernández-González, Raquel, 2015. "Institutional analysis, allocation of liabilities and third-party enforcement via courts: The case of the Prestige oil spill," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 90-101.
    6. Seth W. Norton, 2003. "Economic Institutions and Human Well-Being: A Cross-National Analysis," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 29(1), pages 23-40, Winter.
    7. Eckardt, Martina, 1999. "The Evolution of the German Tort Law in the 19th Century - An Economic Analysis of the Evolution of Law," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 23, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    8. Achim Lerch, 1998. "Property Rights and Biodiversity," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 285-304, November.
    9. Bellanger, Manuel & Fonner, Robert & Holland, Daniel S. & Libecap, Gary D. & Lipton, Douglas W. & Scemama, Pierre & Speir, Cameron & Thébaud, Olivier, 2021. "Cross-sectoral externalities related to natural resources and ecosystem services," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    10. Kim, Jongwook & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2005. "Appropriating Economic Rents from Resources: An Integrative Property Rights and Resource-Based Approach," Working Papers 05-0123, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    11. repec:idb:brikps:266 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Wang, Sen & Bogle, Tim & van Kooten, G. Cornelis, 2012. "Forestry and the New Institutional Economics," Working Papers 130818, University of Victoria, Resource Economics and Policy.
    13. Mueller, Bernardo, 2018. "Property Rights Implications for the Brazilian Forest Code," Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural (RESR), Sociedade Brasileira de Economia e Sociologia Rural, vol. 56(2), January.
    14. Raquel Fernández González & María Elena Arce Fariña & María Dolores Garza Gil, 2019. "Resolving Conflict between Parties and Consequences for Foreign Direct Investment: The Repsol-YPF Case in Argentina," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(21), pages 1-16, October.
    15. Eggertsson, Thrainn, 1997. "The old theory of economic policy and the new institutionalism," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 25(8), pages 1187-1203, August.
    16. Guoxing Zhang & Zhenhua Zhang & Xiulin Gao & Lean Yu & Shouyang Wang & Yingluo Wang, 2017. "Impact of Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction Policy Means Coordination on Economic Growth: Quantitative Evidence from China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(5), pages 1-19, April.
    17. Jorge Pinilla & Joaquim Vergés, 2007. "Efectos De La Privatización En La Eficiencia De Iberia Líneas Aéreas De España S.A," Revista Economía y Administración, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Administrativas, Universidad de Concepción, vol. 69, pages 7-38, December.
    18. Engel, Christoph, 0. "Competition in a pure world of Internet telephony," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(8-9), pages 530-540, September.
    19. Roger R. Betancourt, 1991. "The New Institutional Economics and the Study of the Cuban Economy," Annual Proceedings, The Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, vol. 1.
    20. Gerry Rodgers, 1992. "Institutional Economics, Development Economics and Labour Economics," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 31(4), pages 581-605.
    21. Douadia Bougherara & Gilles Grolleau & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2009. "The ‘make or buy’ decision in private environmental transactions," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 79-99, February.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:telsys:v:79:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s11235-021-00872-0. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.