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Corporate merger, organizational form, and control of labor

Author

Listed:
  • Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz

    (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, Universidad del País Vasco, Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre, 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain)

  • María Begoña Garzón

    (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, Universidad del País Vasco, Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre, 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain)

Abstract

This paper shows that, when two firms merge, the increase in the bargaining strength of the multiproduct firm arising from the merger when negotiating uniform wages with the workers is one of the reasons that account for corporate mergers. Moreover, there is a strategic variable that can be used to decrease union rents in the case of merging, namely, the organization of production decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz & María Begoña Garzón, 2000. "Corporate merger, organizational form, and control of labor," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 129-144.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:specre:v:2:y:2000:i:2:p:129-144
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Barcena-Ruiz, Juan Carlos, 2003. "Politically preferred wage bargaining structures," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 341-353, June.
    2. Kjell Erik Lommerud & Odd Rune Straume & Lars Sørgard & Odd Rune Straume, 2002. "Downstream Merger with Oligopolistic Input Suppliers," CESifo Working Paper Series 733, CESifo.
    3. Symeonidis, George, 2010. "Downstream merger and welfare in a bilateral oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 230-243, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mergers; multiproduct firms; wage bargaining;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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