A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-0984-x
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- Kasajima, Yoichi & Toda, Manabu, 2024. "Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 269-286.
- Hirata, Daisuke & 平田, 大祐 & Kasuya, Yusuke & 糟谷, 祐介 & Okumura, Yasunori & 奥村, 保規, 2023. "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Respect for Improvements," Discussion Papers 2023-01, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Yoichi Kasajima & Manabu Toda, 2021. "Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems," Working Papers 2023-1, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
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