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On relative egalitarianism

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  • Yves Sprumont

Abstract

We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social ordering when alternatives are lotteries and individual preferences are of the von Neumann–Morgenstern type. Relative egalitarianism ranks alternatives by applying the leximin ordering to the distributions of 0–1 normalized utilities they generate. We propose an axiomatic characterization of this aggregation rule. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

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  • Yves Sprumont, 2013. "On relative egalitarianism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 1015-1032, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:4:p:1015-1032
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-012-0653-7
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    Cited by:

    1. Vincent Martinet & Pedro Gajardo & Michel Lara, 2024. "Bargaining on monotonic social choice environments," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 96(2), pages 209-238, March.
    2. Thierry Marchant, 2019. "Utilitarianism without individual utilities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(1), pages 1-19, June.
    3. Bossert, Walter & Sprumont, Yves, 2014. "Strategy-proof preference aggregation: Possibilities and characterizations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 109-126.
    4. Yves Sprumont, 2020. "Nash welfarism and the distributive implications of informational constraints," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 49-64, April.
    5. Marc Fleurbaey & Stéphane Zuber, 2021. "Fair Utilitarianism," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 370-401, May.
    6. Vincent Martinet & Pedro Gajardo & Michel de Lara, 2021. "Bargaining On Monotonic Economic Environments," Working Papers hal-03206724, HAL.
    7. Moti Michaeli, 2021. "On Measuring Welfare ‘Behind a Veil of Ignorance’," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(1), pages 57-66, January.
    8. Edi Karni & John A. Weymark, 2024. "Impartiality and relative utilitarianism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 63(1), pages 1-18, August.
    9. Amarante, Massimiliano & Ghossoub, Mario, 2021. "Aggregation of opinions and risk measures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    10. Walter Bossert & Yves Sprumont, 2012. "Strategy-proof Preference Aggregation," Cahiers de recherche 12-2012, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.

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