A fair division solution to the problem of redistricting
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-008-0336-6
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References listed on IDEAS
- Nicola Apollonio & Ronald I. Becker & Isabella Lari & Federica Ricca & Bruno Simeone, 2006. "The Sunfish Against the Octopus: Opposing Compactness to Gerrymandering," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Bruno Simeone & Friedrich Pukelsheim (ed.), Mathematics and Democracy, pages 19-41, Springer.
- Brams,Steven J. & Taylor,Alan D., 1996. "Fair Division," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521556446.
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Cited by:
- Clemens Puppe & Attila Tasnádi, 2015.
"Axiomatic districting,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(1), pages 31-50, January.
- Puppe, Clemens & Tasnádi, Attila, 2011. "Axiomatic districting," Working Paper Series in Economics 24, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
- Puppe, Clemens & Tasnádi, Attila, 2014. "Axiomatic districting," Corvinus Economics Working Papers (CEWP) 2014/01, Corvinus University of Budapest.
- Erel Segal-Halevi & Shmuel Nitzan, 2014. "Cake Cutting – Fair and Square," Working Papers 2014-01, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
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