Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-008-0355-3
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References listed on IDEAS
- Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen, 1991. "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(1), pages 121-128.
- Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-1099, September.
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Cited by:
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2012.
"Nash implementation with partially honest individuals,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 154-169.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2009. "Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 920, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2009. "Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals," Economic Research Papers 271188, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Laslier, Jean-François & Núñez, Matías & Remzi Sanver, M., 2021.
"A solution to the two-person implementation problem,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
- Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & M Remzi Sanver, 2020. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," PSE Working Papers halshs-02173504, HAL.
- Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," Post-Print hal-03498370, HAL.
- Jean-François Laslier & Matías Núñez & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," Post-Print halshs-03342559, HAL.
- Jean-François Laslier & Matías Núñez & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03342559, HAL.
- Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & M Remzi Sanver, 2020. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," Working Papers halshs-02173504, HAL.
- Lombardi, Michele, 2010. "Two-agent Nash implementation with partially-honest agents: Almost Full Characterizations," MPRA Paper 27834, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011.
"Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results,"
MPRA Paper
28838, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅 & ヨシハラ, ナオキ, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," Discussion Paper Series 555, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," CCES Discussion Paper Series 43, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Shuichi Tsugawa, 2021. "Two-agent interactive implementation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(4), pages 251-266, December.
- Laslier, Jean-François & Núñez, Matías & Pimienta, Carlos, 2017.
"Reaching consensus through approval bargaining,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 241-251.
- Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & Carlos Pimienta, 2017. "Reaching consensus through approval bargaining," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01630037, HAL.
- Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & Carlos Pimienta, 2017. "Reaching consensus through approval bargaining," Post-Print halshs-01630037, HAL.
- Meng, Dawen & Tian, Guoqiang, 2014. "Collusion-Proof Mechanism Design in Two-Agent Nonlinear Pricing Environments," MPRA Paper 57931, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Yadav, Sonal, 2016. "Selecting winners with partially honest jurors," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 35-43.
- Ohashi, Yoshihiro, 2014. "A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 63-68.
- Wu, Haoyang, 2011. "Two-agent Nash implementation: A new result," MPRA Paper 30068, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," MPRA Paper 48234, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 11 Jul 2013.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization," Working Papers SDES-2017-15, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Aug 2017.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2018. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization," Working Papers SDES-2018-13, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Oct 2018.
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