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An Efficient and Egalitarian Negotiation Procedure for Economies with Externalities

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  • Nicolás Porteiro

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  • Nicolás Porteiro, 2007. "An Efficient and Egalitarian Negotiation Procedure for Economies with Externalities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 19-40, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:28:y:2007:i:1:p:19-40
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0156-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gul, Faruk, 1989. "Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 81-95, January.
    2. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 274-294, October.
    3. Krishna, Vijay & Serrano, Roberto, 1995. "Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 24(3), pages 259-272.
    4. Mutuswami, Suresh & Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2004. "Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 111-123, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Camiña, Ester & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2009. "The role of mediation in peacemaking and peacekeeping negotiations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 73-92, January.
    2. Pérez-Castrillo, David & Quérou, Nicolas, 2012. "Smooth multibidding mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 420-438.
    3. Nicolás Porteiro & Antonio Villar, 2015. "Appointing high-court judges by political parties," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 91-99, March.
    4. Licun Xue & Lingling Zhang, 2012. "Bidding and sequential coalition formation with externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(1), pages 49-73, February.

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