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Fully-Revealing Equilibria of Multiple-Sender Signaling and Screening Models

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  • David Baron
  • Adam Meirowitz

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  • David Baron & Adam Meirowitz, 2006. "Fully-Revealing Equilibria of Multiple-Sender Signaling and Screening Models," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(3), pages 455-470, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:26:y:2006:i:3:p:455-470
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0091-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1997. "Collusion under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 875-912, July.
    2. Marco Battaglini, 2002. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1379-1401, July.
    3. Austen-Smith, David & Riker, William H., 1987. "Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(3), pages 897-918, September.
    4. Nahum D. Melumad & Toshiyuki Shibano, 1991. "Communication in Settings with No. Transfers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 173-198, Summer.
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    Cited by:

    1. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(7), pages 1541-1563, July.
    2. Alistair J. Wilson & Emanuel Vespa, 2012. "Communication With Multiple Senders and Multiple Dimensions: An Experiment," Working Paper 384, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Mar 2012.
    3. Minozzi, William & Woon, Jonathan, 2019. "The limited value of a second opinion: Competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 144-162.
    4. Alistair J. Wilson & Emanuel Vespa, 2012. "Communication With Multiple Senders and Multiple Dimensions: An Experiment," Working Paper 401, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Mar 2012.
    5. Adam Meirowitz, 2007. "Communication and bargaining in the spatial model," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(2), pages 251-266, January.
    6. Alistair Wilson & Emanuel Vespa, 2012. "Communication With Multiple Senders and Multiple Dimensions: An Experiment," Working Paper 461, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Sep 2012.

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