IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/sochwe/v26y2006i1p75-92.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Scoring of web pages and tournaments—axiomatizations

Author

Listed:
  • Giora Slutzki
  • Oscar Volij

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Giora Slutzki & Oscar Volij, 2006. "Scoring of web pages and tournaments—axiomatizations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(1), pages 75-92, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:26:y:2006:i:1:p:75-92
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-005-0033-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-005-0033-7
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00355-005-0033-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521004046.
    2. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Gerard van der Laan & Dolf Talman, 2001. "Measuring the Power of Nodes in Digraphs," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 01-096/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & Oscar Volij, 2004. "The Measurement of Intellectual Influence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 963-977, May.
    4. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521808163.
    5. Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    6. Donald G. Saari & Vincent R. Merlin, 1996. "The Copeland method (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 51-76.
    7. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Gerard van der Laan & Dolf Talman, 2001. "Measuring the Power of Nodes in Digraphs," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 01-096/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Michael Ackerman & Sul-Young Choi & Peter Coughlin & Eric Gottlieb & Japheth Wood, 2013. "Elections with partially ordered preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 145-168, October.
    2. Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2022. "Majority Judgment vs. Approval Voting," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 70(3), pages 1296-1316, May.
    3. Donald Saari, 2006. "Which is better: the Condorcet or Borda winner?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(1), pages 107-129, January.
    4. Aki Lehtinen, 2007. "The Borda rule is also intended for dishonest men," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 73-90, October.
    5. Herrade Igersheim, 2005. "Extending Xu's results to Arrow''s Impossibility Theorem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(13), pages 1-6.
    6. Borm, Peter & van den Brink, Rene & Levinsky, Rene & Slikker, Marco, 2004. "On two new social choice correspondences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 51-68, January.
    7. Conal Duddy & Ashley Piggins & William Zwicker, 2016. "Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(2), pages 301-333, February.
    8. Abhijit Chandra & Sunanda Roy, 2013. "On removing Condorcet effects from pairwise election tallies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 1143-1158, April.
    9. Shmuel Nitzan, 2010. "Demystifying the ‘metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion’," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(1), pages 25-28, June.
    10. Leo Katz, 2010. "A Theory of Loopholes," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 1-31, January.
    11. Shin Sato, 2012. "On strategy-proof social choice under categorization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 455-471, March.
    12. Antoinette Baujard, 2006. "L'estimation des préférences individuelles en vue de la décision publique. Problèmes, paradoxes, enjeux," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 175(4), pages 51-63.
    13. Colignatus, Thomas, 2013. "The performance of four possible rules for selecting the Prime Minister after the Dutch Parliamentary elections of September 2012," MPRA Paper 44158, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Feb 2013.
    14. Peter Emerson, 2013. "The original Borda count and partial voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 353-358, February.
    15. Colignatus, Thomas, 2007. "In a democracy, Bayrou would have won. Application of the Borda Fixed Point method to the 2007 French presidential elections," MPRA Paper 3170, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Daniel Bochsler, 2010. "The Marquis de Condorcet goes to Bern," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 119-131, July.
    17. Hartvigsen, David, 2006. "Vote trading in public elections," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 31-48, July.
    18. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 1-38, January.
    19. Quesada, Antonio, 2005. "A positional version of Arrow's theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(8), pages 1053-1059, December.
    20. Herrade Igersheim, 2006. "Invoking a Cartesian Product Structure on Social States: New Resolutions of Sen's and Gibbard's Impossibility Theorems," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 659.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:26:y:2006:i:1:p:75-92. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.