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Why the count de Borda cannot beat the Marquis de Condorcet

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  • Mathias Risse

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  • Mathias Risse, 2005. "Why the count de Borda cannot beat the Marquis de Condorcet," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(1), pages 95-113, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:25:y:2005:i:1:p:95-113
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-005-0045-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Young, H. P., 1988. "Condorcet's Theory of Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(4), pages 1231-1244, December.
    2. Donald G. Saari & Vincent R. Merlin, 2000. "A geometric examination of Kemeny's rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(3), pages 403-438.
    3. Michael Dummett, 1998. "The Borda count and agenda manipulation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(2), pages 289-296.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Burka, Dávid & Puppe, Clemens & Szepesváry, László & Tasnádi, Attila, 2016. "Neural networks would 'vote' according to Borda's Rule," Corvinus Economics Working Papers (CEWP) 2016/13, Corvinus University of Budapest.
    2. Burka, Dávid & Puppe, Clemens & Szepesváry, László & Tasnádi, Attila, 2022. "Voting: A machine learning approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 299(3), pages 1003-1017.
    3. Hanna Bury & Dariusz Wagner, 2009. "Group judgement with ties. A position-based approach," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Technology, Institute of Organization and Management, vol. 4, pages 9-26.
    4. Salvatore Barbaro, 2021. "A social-choice perspective on authoritarianism and political polarization," Working Papers 2108, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.
    5. Islam, Jamal & Mohajan, Haradhan & Moolio, Pahlaj, 2010. "Median voter model cannot solve all the problems of voting system," MPRA Paper 50696, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Feb 2011.
    6. Surekha K Rao & Bhaskara Rao Kopparty, 2015. "A Note on Borda Method," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(3), pages 1969-1975.
    7. Joaquín Pérez & José L. Jimeno & Estefanía García, 2015. "No Show Paradox and the Golden Number in Generalized Condorcet Voting Methods," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 497-513, May.
    8. Truchon, Michel, 2008. "Borda and the maximum likelihood approach to vote aggregation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 96-102, January.
    9. Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2016. "Is majority consistency possible?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(2), pages 287-299, February.
    10. Hanna Bury & Dariusz Wagner, 2009. "Group judgment with ties. A position-based approach," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 19(4), pages 7-26.
    11. Hannu Nurmi, 2007. "Assessing Borda's Rule and Its Modifications," Discussion Papers 15, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    12. Islam, Jamal & Mohajan, Haradhan & Moolio, Pahlaj, 2010. "Methods of voting system and manipulation of voting," MPRA Paper 50854, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 May 2010.

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