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Vergleichende Analyse verschiedener Ausprägungen einer erhöhten Besteuerung von Bonuszahlungen

Author

Listed:
  • Fabian Meißner

    (Universität Paderborn)

  • Georg Schneider

    (Universität Paderborn)

  • Andreas Scholze

    (Universität Osnabrück)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung In diesem Beitrag wird die Einführung einer Bonussteuer in zwei Fallgestaltungen untersucht. Im ersten Fall wird eine erhöhte Einkommensteuer auf variable Vergütungen erhoben, die vom Manager getragen werden muss. Im zweiten Fall wird eine Strafsteuer auf ausgeschüttete Boni modelliert, die von den Unternehmenseignern zu entrichten ist. Es wird aufgezeigt, dass die Gewinnerwartung des Unternehmens mit Einführung beider Steuerarten bis zu einer Höhe absinken kann, die eine finanzielle Anreizsetzung unvertretbar macht und somit zu einer Abnahme der Produktivität des Unternehmens führt. Der anschließende Vergleich beider Besteuerungsvarianten ergibt ein heterogenes Bild. Unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Anreizkompatibilität ist die Strafsteuer zu bevorzugen. Im Hinblick auf die Höhe des Gesamtsteueraufkommens stellt sich hingegen die erhöhte Einkommensteuer als einträglicher dar.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabian Meißner & Georg Schneider & Andreas Scholze, 2014. "Vergleichende Analyse verschiedener Ausprägungen einer erhöhten Besteuerung von Bonuszahlungen," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 66(3), pages 212-241, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:66:y:2014:i:3:d:10.1007_bf03372897
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03372897
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    D86; H21; H25; M41.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies

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