Antecedents of Intentionally Incomplete Inter-Firm Contracts
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DOI: 10.1007/BF03373750
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Keywords
L14L24 D86 J41;JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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