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Pauschalierung der Einkommensteuer - Neue Anreize betrieblicher Entgeltpolitik

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  • Jan Voßmerbäumer

    (Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Seit 2007 können Unternehmen die Steuer auf betriebliche Sachzuwendungen an Arbeitnehmer mit einem pauschalen Nominaltarif von 30% übernehmen. Daraus entstehen Anreize, regulär besteuerte Bruttolöhne durch pauschal besteuerte Sachzuwendungen zu ersetzen. Anhand eines Grenzbelastungsvergleichs wird erstmals gezeigt, dass eine Lohnumwandlung eine deutliche Reduzierung der Gesamtbelastung aus Steuern und Sozialversicherungsbeiträgen zur Folge hat. Die Belastungsvorteile können zur Reduzierung der Lohnkosten des Arbeitgebers genutzt werden oder dem Arbeitnehmer einen höheren Nettonutzen verschaffen. Konsequenz der Begünstigung können jedoch ineffiziente Allokationswirkungen und unerwünschte Distributionseffekte sein.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Voßmerbäumer, 2010. "Pauschalierung der Einkommensteuer - Neue Anreize betrieblicher Entgeltpolitik," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 203-226, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:62:y:2010:i:2:d:10.1007_bf03377358
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03377358
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    H21; H24; K34; M52;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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