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Ausschüttungsbegrenzung und liquidationsfinanzierte Ausschüttungen — wie sinnvoll ist vorsichtige Rechnungslegung?

Author

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  • Stefan Wielenberg

    (Leibniz Universität Hannover)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Die bilanzorientierte Ausschüttungsbegrenzung auf der Basis von vorsichtiger Gewinnermittlung gehört in Deutschland zu den Eckpfeilern des Gläubigerschutzes in haftungsbeschränkten Unternehmen. Das Vorsichtsprinzip sorgt für eine bescheidene Berechnung des ausschüttbaren Betrags und damit nach herrschender Meinung für eine höhere Werthaltigkeit der Ansprüche der Gläubiger. Ökonomische Analysen zeigen, dass dieser Zusammenhang keineswegs allgemeingültig, sondern von den Investitionsmöglichkeiten und der Finanzierungspolitik des Unternehmens abhängig ist. Dieser Aufsatz geht noch einen Schritt weiter: Vorsichtige Rechnungslegung führt zu einer Unterbewertung von Vermögensgegenständen und kann daher bei mehrperiodiger Betrachtung zu ineffizienten Liquidationsanreizen führen. Dieser Effekt wird in einem einfachen Modell analysiert, um deutlich zu machen, welche Einflussfaktoren negative Auswirkungen der vorsichtigen Gewinnermittlung begünstigen. Es zeigt sich, dass in manchen Fällen auch Zuschreibungen, Wertaufholungen oder bescheidene planmäßige Abschreibungen gläubigerschützende Wirkungen entfalten können.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Wielenberg, 2009. "Ausschüttungsbegrenzung und liquidationsfinanzierte Ausschüttungen — wie sinnvoll ist vorsichtige Rechnungslegung?," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 2-21, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:61:y:2009:i:1:d:10.1007_bf03371736
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03371736
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    G33; G35; K22; M41;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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