IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/sjobre/v53y2001i5d10.1007_bf03372657.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Kapitalmarktorientierte Unternehmenspublizität und der Informationsverbund zwischen in- und externem Rechnungswesen

Author

Listed:
  • Alexis H. Kunz

    (Fachhochschule Aargau)

  • Thomas Pfeiffer

    (Universität Zürich)

Abstract

Summary Recent revisions in German accounting laws are heavily promoting the informational function of financial accounting systems. Until now possibly detrimental ramifications of such regulations for a firm’s internal governance structures have not been investigated. We develop a game-theoretical model which explicitly accounts for information transfers between a firm’s financial accounting system and its management accounting system. The subsequent analysis identifies conditions under which a firm’s internal allocation processes are either detrimentally or beneficially affected when federal laws force a firm to credibly report finer information to the capital markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexis H. Kunz & Thomas Pfeiffer, 2001. "Kapitalmarktorientierte Unternehmenspublizität und der Informationsverbund zwischen in- und externem Rechnungswesen," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 53(5), pages 500-530, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:53:y:2001:i:5:d:10.1007_bf03372657
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03372657
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF03372657
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/BF03372657?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-785, July.
    2. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(2), pages 387-432.
    3. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    4. Baiman, S & Verrecchia, RE, 1996. "The relation among capital markets, financial disclosure, production efficiency, and insider trading," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(1), pages 1-22.
    5. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 201-228, Fall.
    6. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-483, December.
    7. Baiman, S & Evans, Jh, 1983. "Pre-Decision Information And Participative Management Control-Systems," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(2), pages 371-395.
    8. Baiman, Stanley & Verrecchia, Robert E., 1995. "Earnings and price-based compensation contracts in the presence of discretionary trading and incomplete contracting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 93-121, July.
    9. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    10. Penno, M, 1984. "Asymmetry Of Pre-Decision Information And Managerial Accounting," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 177-191.
    11. Diamond, Douglas W & Verrecchia, Robert E, 1991. "Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1325-1359, September.
    12. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1973. "Where Are We in the Theory of Information?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 31-39, May.
    13. Banker, Rd & Datar, Sm, 1989. "Sensitivity, Precision, And Linear Aggregation Of Signals For Performance Evaluation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 21-39.
    14. Bushman, Robert M. & Indjejikian, Raffi J., 1993. "Accounting income, stock price, and managerial compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 3-23, April.
    15. Vaysman, Igor, 1998. "A model of negotiated transfer pricing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 349-384, June.
    16. John Christensen, 1981. "Communication in Agencies," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 661-674, Autumn.
    17. Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133, Elsevier.
    18. Alfred Wagenhofer, 1994. "Transfer pricing under asymmetric information," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(1), pages 71-103.
    19. Ohlson, James A, 1984. "The Structure of Asset Prices and Socially Useless-Useful Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(5), pages 1417-1435, December.
    20. Gjesdal, F, 1981. "Accounting For Stewardship," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 208-231.
    21. Verrecchia, Robert E., 1983. "Discretionary disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 179-194, April.
    22. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
    23. Wagenhofer, Alfred, 1990. "Voluntary disclosure with a strategic opponent," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 341-363, March.
    24. Kim, Oliver & Suh, Yoon, 1993. "Incentive efficiency of compensation based on accounting and market performance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 25-53, April.
    25. Phillip C. Stocken & Robert E. Verrecchia, 1999. "Performance Monitoring and Financial Disclosure Choice," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(1), pages 214-214, March.
    26. Marshall, John M, 1974. "Private Incentives and Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 373-390, June.
    27. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lambert, Richard A., 2001. "Contracting theory and accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 3-87, December.
    2. Verrecchia, Robert E., 2001. "Essays on disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 97-180, December.
    3. Beyer, Anne & Cohen, Daniel A. & Lys, Thomas Z. & Walther, Beverly R., 2010. "The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 296-343, December.
    4. Bushman, Robert M. & Smith, Abbie J., 2001. "Financial accounting information and corporate governance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 237-333, December.
    5. Liang Guo, 2021. "Partial Unraveling and Strategic Contract Timing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(12), pages 7719-7736, December.
    6. Eitan Goldman & Gary Gorton, 2000. "The Visible Hand, the Invisible Hand and Efficiency," NBER Working Papers 7587, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo, 2004. "Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 3-30, March.
    8. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2001. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(4), pages 394-411, August.
    9. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans, 2020. "On efficient firm formation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 1-12.
    10. Marshall, Andrew P. & Weetman, Pauline, 2002. "Information asymmetry in disclosure of foreign exchange risk management: can regulation be effective?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 31-53.
    11. Chatterjee Kalyan & Chiu Y. Stephen, 2007. "When Does Competition Lead to Efficient Investments?," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-39, July.
    12. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2001. "Alignement of Interests and the Governance of Joint Ventures," IDEI Working Papers 441, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    13. Nagar, Venky & Nanda, Dhananjay & Wysocki, Peter, 2003. "Discretionary disclosure and stock-based incentives," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-3), pages 283-309, January.
    14. Stephan Hollander & Maarten Pronk & Erik Roelofsen, 2010. "Does Silence Speak? An Empirical Analysis of Disclosure Choices During Conference Calls," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 531-563, June.
    15. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2016. "Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2016-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
    16. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001. "The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
    17. Luminita Enache & Antonio Parbonetti & Anup Srivastava, 2020. "Are all outside directors created equal with respect to firm disclosure policy?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 541-577, August.
    18. Ilya Segal & Michael D.Whinston, 2012. "Property Rights [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    19. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Sliwka, Dirk, 2001. "On synergies and vertical integration," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1281-1295, September.
    20. Miles Gietzmann & Marco Trombetta, 2003. "Disclosure interactions: accounting policy choice and voluntary disclosure effects on the cost of raising outside capital," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(3), pages 187-205.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    D23; G31; M41;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:53:y:2001:i:5:d:10.1007_bf03372657. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.