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Performance Monitoring and Financial Disclosure Choice

Author

Listed:
  • Phillip C. Stocken
  • Robert E. Verrecchia

Abstract

We model the relationship between an entrepreneur's monitoring of a manager's performance and the entrepreneur's choice of the firm's financial disclosure policy. The environment is characterized by incomplete contracting and the presence of informed traders. We show that the entrepreneur may not generally choose to provide the most informative financial reporting disclosures to shareholders.

Suggested Citation

  • Phillip C. Stocken & Robert E. Verrecchia, 1999. "Performance Monitoring and Financial Disclosure Choice," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(1), pages 214-214, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199903)155:1_214:pmafdc_2.0.tx_2-t
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    Cited by:

    1. Alexis H. Kunz & Thomas Pfeiffer, 2001. "Kapitalmarktorientierte Unternehmenspublizität und der Informationsverbund zwischen in- und externem Rechnungswesen," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 53(5), pages 500-530, August.
    2. Lambert, Richard A., 2001. "Contracting theory and accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 3-87, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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