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Public goods and decay in networks

Author

Listed:
  • Enrique Fatas
  • Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez
  • Antonio Morales
  • Hector Solaz

Abstract

We propose a simple behavioral model to analyze situations where (1) a group of agents repeatedly plays a public goods game within a network structure and (2) each agent only observes the past behavior of her neighbors, but is affected by the decisions of the whole group. The model assumes that agents are imperfect conditional cooperators, that they infer unobserved contributions assuming imperfect conditional cooperation by others, and that they have some degree of bounded rationality. We show that our model approximates quite accurately regularities derived from public goods game experiments. Copyright The Author(s) 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Enrique Fatas & Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez & Antonio Morales & Hector Solaz, 2015. "Public goods and decay in networks," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 73-90, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:series:v:6:y:2015:i:1:p:73-90
    DOI: 10.1007/s13209-014-0114-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Natalia Borzino & Enrique Fatas & Emmanuel Peterle, 2023. "In transparency we trust an experimental study of reputation, transparency, and signaling," Post-Print hal-04532867, HAL.
    2. Gaudeul, Alexia & Giannetti, Caterina, 2017. "The effect of privacy concerns on social network formation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 233-253.
    3. Borzino, Natalia & Fatas, Enrique & Peterle, Emmanuel, 2023. "In transparency we trust an experimental study of reputation, transparency, and signaling," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 106(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public good; Networks; Decay; H41; C92;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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