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Mark Copelovitch. 2010. The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy: Banks, bonds, and bailouts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

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  • Daniel Nielson

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  • Daniel Nielson, 2013. "Mark Copelovitch. 2010. The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy: Banks, bonds, and bailouts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 117-120, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:8:y:2013:i:1:p:117-120
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-012-9156-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Graham Bird & Dane Rowlands, 2003. "Political Economy Influences Within the Life‐Cycle of IMF Programmes," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(9), pages 1255-1278, September.
    2. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-769, August.
    3. Nielson, Daniel L. & Tierney, Michael J., 2003. "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 241-276, April.
    4. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2012. "Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 363-397, April.
    5. Copelovitch,Mark S., 2010. "The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521143585, October.
    6. Mona Lyne & Daniel Nielson & Michael Tierney, 2009. "Controlling coalitions: Social lending at the multilateral development banks," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 407-433, December.
    7. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521194334 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Darren Hawkins & Wade Jacoby, 2008. "Agent permeability, principal delegation and the European Court of Human Rights," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-28, March.
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