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The power of having powerful friends: Evidence from a new dataset of IMF negotiating missions, 1985-2020

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  • Lauren L. Ferry

    (University of Mississippi)

  • Alexandra O. Zeitz

    (Concordia University)

Abstract

When countries are confronted with a crisis and have no alternative but to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), speed is of the essence. Why do some countries negotiate IMF loans more quickly than others? We introduce an original dataset on the timing and intensity of negotiations between the borrowing government and IMF staff for more than 700 IMF loans agreed between 1985 and 2020. Applying concepts from this special issue on the “Power of the Weak” (Snidal et al., 2024), we argue that although borrowing countries are in a weak position when they approach the IMF, they nonetheless sometimes achieve more rapid negotiations. In particular, we argue that borrowers can obtain speedier negotiations on the basis of their ties to major IMF shareholder states, specifically through shared membership in other international organizations and financial exposure. Importantly, we suggest that well-placed borrowers can hasten the conclusion of negotiations without compromising on the conditions attached to IMF programs. We use our original data and an illustrative case study of Côte d’Ivoire to support our claims.

Suggested Citation

  • Lauren L. Ferry & Alexandra O. Zeitz, 2024. "The power of having powerful friends: Evidence from a new dataset of IMF negotiating missions, 1985-2020," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 411-442, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:19:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s11558-024-09537-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-024-09537-4
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