IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/revint/v12y2017i2d10.1007_s11558-017-9272-5.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The politics of contract allocation in the World Bank

Author

Listed:
  • Elena V. McLean

    (University at Buffalo, SUNY)

Abstract

Scholarship on informal politics in multilateral aid organizations investigates all stages of the allocation process - from project identification to aid disbursement and project evaluation. Yet, one area remains almost entirely overlooked in the literature - allocation of aid-financed contracts. This article aims to address the shortcoming of the existing research and develops a theory of contract allocation in a prominent multilateral aid organization – the World Bank. The theoretical argument explores the relationship between formal procurement arrangements and recipients’ control over contract allocation, and the role of this relationship in explaining patterns of contract allocation. My empirical analyses using data on the World Bank’s contracts provide evidence of recipients’ ability to allocate contracts in favor of domestic companies, as well as bilateral aid donors.

Suggested Citation

  • Elena V. McLean, 2017. "The politics of contract allocation in the World Bank," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 255-279, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:12:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11558-017-9272-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-017-9272-5
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11558-017-9272-5
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11558-017-9272-5?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Axel Dreher & Andreas Fuchs, 2015. "Rogue aid? An empirical analysis of China's aid allocation," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 48(3), pages 988-1023, August.
    2. Axel Dreher & Peter Nunnenkamp & Rainer Thiele, 2008. "Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 139-164, July.
    3. Michael A. Bailey & Anton Strezhnev & Erik Voeten, 2017. "Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(2), pages 430-456, February.
    4. Faini, Riccardo & Grilli, Enzo, 2004. "Who Runs the IFIs?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4666, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Alesina, Alberto & Dollar, David, 2000. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 33-63, March.
    6. Dreher, Axel & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Thiele, Rainer, 2011. "Are ‘New’ Donors Different? Comparing the Allocation of Bilateral Aid Between nonDAC and DAC Donor Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(11), pages 1950-1968.
    7. D. Scott Bennett & Allan C. Stam, 2000. "Eugene : A conceptual manual," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(2), pages 179-204, March.
    8. Miyagiwa, Kaz, 1991. "Oligopoly and Discriminatory Government Procurement Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1320-1328, December.
    9. Younas, Javed, 2008. "Motivation for bilateral aid allocation: Altruism or trade benefits," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 661-674, September.
    10. Christopher Kilby, 2011. "Informal influence in the Asian Development Bank," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 223-257, September.
    11. Stone, Randall W., 2008. "The Scope of IMF Conditionality," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 589-620, October.
    12. Federico Trionfetti, 2000. "Discriminatory Public Procurement and International Trade," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 57-76, January.
    13. Christopher Kilby, 2006. "Donor influence in multilateral development banks: The case of the Asian Development Bank," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 173-195, June.
    14. Branco, Fernando, 1994. "Favoring domestic firms in procurement contracts," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1-2), pages 65-80, August.
    15. Carter, David B. & Stone, Randall W., 2015. "Democracy and Multilateralism: The Case of Vote Buying in the UN General Assembly," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 1-33, January.
    16. James Vreeland, 2011. "Foreign aid and global governance: Buying Bretton Woods – the Swiss-bloc case," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 369-391, September.
    17. Eric Neumayer, 2003. "Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation? A Quantitative Analysis of 21 Donor Countries," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 84(3), pages 650-666, September.
    18. Vagstad, Steinar, 1995. "Promoting fair competition in public procurement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 283-307, October.
    19. Oliver Morrissey, 1993. "The Mixing of Aid and Trade Policies," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(1), pages 69-84, January.
    20. Schoultz, Lars, 1982. "Politics, economics, and U.S. participation in multilateral development banks," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(3), pages 537-574, July.
    21. Nielson, Daniel L. & Tierney, Michael J., 2003. "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 241-276, April.
    22. Stone, Randall W., 2004. "The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(4), pages 577-591, November.
    23. McLean, Elena V., 2015. "Multilateral Aid and Domestic Economic Interests," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 97-130, January.
    24. Tierney, Michael J. & Nielson, Daniel L. & Hawkins, Darren G. & Roberts, J. Timmons & Findley, Michael G. & Powers, Ryan M. & Parks, Bradley & Wilson, Sven E. & Hicks, Robert L., 2011. "More Dollars than Sense: Refining Our Knowledge of Development Finance Using AidData," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(11), pages 1891-1906.
    25. Ilyana Kuziemko & Eric Werker, 2006. "How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(5), pages 905-930, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Paul Novosad & Eric Werker, 2019. "Who runs the international system? Nationality and leadership in the United Nations Secretariat," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 1-33, March.
    2. McLean, Elena V., 2023. "Looking for advice: The politics of consulting services procurement in the World Bank," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    3. Dreher, Axel & Lang, Valentin F. & Richert, Katharina, 2019. "The political economy of International Finance Corporation lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 242-254.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. McLean, Elena V., 2023. "Looking for advice: The politics of consulting services procurement in the World Bank," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    2. Lauren L. Ferry & Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Christina J. Schneider, 2020. "Catch me if you care: International development organizations and national corruption," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 767-792, October.
    3. Broich, Tobias, 2017. "Do authoritarian regimes receive more Chinese development finance than democratic ones? Empirical evidence for Africa," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 180-207.
    4. Angelika J. Budjan & Andreas Fuchs, 2021. "Democracy and Aid Donorship," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 217-238, November.
    5. Broich, Tobias, 2017. "Do authoritarian regimes receive more Chinese development finance than democratic ones? Empirical evidence for Africa," MERIT Working Papers 2017-011, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    6. Asmus, Gerda & Eichenauer, Vera & Fuchs, Andreas & Parks, Bradley, 2021. "Does India use development finance to compete with China? A subnational analysis," Kiel Working Papers 2189, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    7. Fuchs, Andreas & Klann, Nils-Hendrik, 2013. "Emergency Aid 2.0," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79898, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Axel Dreher & Andreas Fuchs, 2015. "Rogue aid? An empirical analysis of China's aid allocation," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(3), pages 988-1023, August.
    9. Ayse Kaya & Byungwon Woo, 2022. "China and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB): Chinese Influence Over Membership Shares?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 781-813, October.
    10. Fuchs, Andreas & Vadlamannati, Krishna Chaitanya, 2013. "The Needy Donor: An Empirical Analysis of India’s Aid Motives," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 110-128.
    11. Dreher, Axel & Lang, Valentin & Reinsberg, Bernhard, 2024. "Aid effectiveness and donor motives," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 176(C).
    12. Stubbs, Thomas H. & Kentikelenis, Alexander E. & King, Lawrence P., 2016. "Catalyzing Aid? The IMF and Donor Behavior in Aid Allocation," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 511-528.
    13. Masaki, Takaaki, 2016. "Coups d’État and Foreign Aid," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 51-68.
    14. Öhler, Hannes & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Dreher, Axel, 2012. "Does conditionality work? A test for an innovative US aid scheme," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 138-153.
    15. Minasyan, Anna, 2018. "US aid, US educated leaders and economic ideology," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 244-257.
    16. Ambrocio, Gene & Hasan, Iftekhar, 2019. "Friends for the benefits: The effects of political ties on sovereign borrowing conditions," Research Discussion Papers 13/2019, Bank of Finland.
    17. Toke S. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk, 2019. "Foreign in influence and domestic policy: A survey," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1928, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    18. James Vreeland, 2011. "Foreign aid and global governance: Buying Bretton Woods – the Swiss-bloc case," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 369-391, September.
    19. Axel Dreher & Andreas Fuchs, 2011. "Rogue Aid? The Determinants of China’s Aid Allocation," Working Papers CEB 11-035, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    20. Axel Dreher & Stephan Klasen & James Raymond Vreeland & Eric Werker, 2013. "The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically Driven Aid Less Effective?," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(1), pages 157-191.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:12:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11558-017-9272-5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.